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In its modern forms, psychotherapy often plays a secularizing and sometimes even anti-
theistic role.  Yet the Stoic philosophy which inspired the creation of modern Cognitive Behavior 
Therapy (CBT) had a substantially theological view of human nature and human flourishing.  
While the idea and practice of creating behavioral and emotional change through cognitive 
change was appropriated from Stoicism into modern CBT, the idea of morally grounding such 
practices in a normative conceptualization of human nature was not.  By contrast, early Christian 
spirituality, was also profoundly influenced by the Stoic conceptualizations of achieving 
emotional and behavioral change through cognitive change, yet the Christian appropriation of 
these concepts retains and adapts the original Stoic normative conception of human nature.  This 
paper will present the similarities and differences in how Stoicism influenced both early 
Christian Spirituality and Modern CBT.  It will argue that both Christian Spirituality and CBT 
have much to learn from each other. 
Existing published research already compares CBT with its Stoic antecedents,1 shows the 
influences of Stoicism on early Christianity,2 and even compares modern CBT with ancient 
Christian Ascetic Spirituality.3  But there does not appear to be any published work that presents 
the broad similarities and differences in how Stoicism influences CBT and early Christianity.  
This paper aims to fill that void.  It accomplishes this by identifying the Stoic influences in the 
thought of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapists Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck as well as in 
authoritative Christian sources of spirituality, the Old and New Testaments, St. Anthony of the 
                                                          
1 Donald Robertson, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT): Stoic Philosophy as Rational and 
Cognitive Psychotherapy (London: Karnac, 2010). 
2Tuomas Raisimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg (eds.), Stoicism in Early Christianity. Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010. 
3 Father Alexis Trader, Ancient Christian Wisdom and Aaron Beck’s Cognitive Therapy: A Meeting of Minds (New 
York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2012). 
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Desert, Evagrius Ponticus, and St. John Climacus.  It then compares and contrasts how Stoic 
ideas influenced each of these sources in different ways.  Because of these differences and their 
shared pedigree in Stoicism, CBT and Christian Spirituality, are well-positioned to learn from 


















Chapter 1: History, Theory, and Moral Shortcomings of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
“How shall the story of psychology be told?...  In the beginning-1879-psychology was born as 
the science of mental life, studying consciousness with introspection.  Then, in 1913, the 
dominance of mentalism was challenged and shattered by the rude and simplistic behaviorists, 
who made a revolution against the ancient regime mentalists.  They slew the science of mental 
life and replaced it with the science of behavior, creating a decades-long rule of behavior study 
with behavior theory.  However, in 1956, a new revolution began, its makers waving the banner 
of cognition, aided by outside forces from linguistics and artificial intelligence.  After two 
decades of struggle, the ancient regime of behaviorism was defeated, or at least repressed, and 
the rule of information processing cognitive psychology began.”4 
 
 The above passage introduces and summarizes the contents of this chapter.  In this 
chapter, we will trace the rise of cognitivism out of the dominant Freudian and Behavioristic 
paradigms which preceded it.  We will discuss various forms of therapy associated with each of 
these paradigms.  We will show how Cognitive forms of therapy were invented to compensate 
for theoretical and clinical weaknesses of Behaviorism and Freudian Psychoanalysis. It will, 
however, also show weaknesses in CBT as it is practiced today, in that it lacks an integrated 
theory of human flourishing or normativity. 
Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Psychiatry and Psychology were competing 
disciplines.  Psychiatry, a branch of medicine, traced its roots through the history of treating the 
mentally ill and insane back to ancient times.5  Psychology, on the other hand, was a new 
discipline which sought a fresh start on understanding human behavior through the rigorous 
                                                          
4Leahey, Thomas H. “The Mythical Revolutions of American Psychology,” in Evolving Perspectives on the History of 
Psychology, eds. Wade E. Pickren and Donald A. Dewsbury (Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association, 
2002), 191. 
5 Charles Ducey and Bennett Simon, “Ancient Greece and Rome,” in World History of Psychiatry, ed. John G. 
Howells (New York: Brunner/Mazel Inc., 1975), 1-38. 
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application of experimental methods for observing, testing, and predicting human behavior.  
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) was born out of the conflict between these two disciplines. 
 Psychiatry tried to cure or alleviate mental illness through a variety of means.  Some were 
analogous to other common medical interventions(e.g, the use of pharmaceuticals),and some 
were mysterious yet appeared effective (e.g., hypnosis and mesmerism),6 and some were 
downright desperate (e.g.,bloodletting and primitive electrocution therapies).7  As a psychiatrist,8 
Freud had experimented with cocaine and was trained in hypnosis,9 but constantly searched for 
new means of treating psychiatric patients. In one particular hypnotherapy session the patient 
rebuked Freud for interrupting her train of thought.  Freud found this event highly significant and 
came to develop a brand of talk-therapy based on the idea of “free-association,”  a process 
wherein the patient spontaneously verbalizes his or her thoughts to the therapist without 
reservation or censorship.10  Freud came to believe that through spontaneous, uncensored 
verbalization of one’s stream of consciousness, the patient would eventually lay bare certain 
patterns which connect a patient’s present symptoms with early childhood traumas and primal 
human drives (most notably the sex-drive).  According to Freud, repressed drives, inherited 
archetypes, and unresolved traumas recapitulate themselves throughout a person’s life.  Once a 
person has come to understand these patterns and is induced to have a “corrective emotional 
experience” through their relationship with a therapist, the cycle of recapitulation would be 
                                                          
6A. A. Roback, History of Psychology and Psychiatry (New York: The Citadel Press, 1961), 63-65.  
7 Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Psychotherapy: Mental Healing as Religion, Rhetoric, and Repression (Garden City, NY: 
Anchor Press, 1978) 43-97. 
8Freud is widely regarded as having been a psychiatrist although his medical training was in Neurology. 
9 J.N. Isbister, Freud: An Introduction to His Life and Work (Cambridge: Polity, 1985), 34-54. 
10Isbister, Freud, 63. 
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broken and the problems were expected to resolve.11  Freud called his new method 
psychoanalysis.   
 Psychoanalysis became famous for its complex and esoteric methods such as dream 
interpretation, analysis of transference (i.e. the way in which a therapist comes to symbolize 
childhood or developmental problems in the mind of the patient),12 doctrines of universal 
archetypes (such as the Oedipus complex)13 as motivators of human thought and behavior, and its 
insistence on an animalistic anthropology based on primitive drives (e.g., drives towards self-
preservation, sex, and death).14  The process by which Freud came to develop his theories of the 
human mind was largely the result of his own personal introspection and speculations, making 
his claims particularly difficult to confirm or falsify scientifically.15  However, for many they 
seemed to offer hope where other interventions had failed.  With Freud’s success, Psychiatry 
rapidly expanded beyond the asylums to which it had previously been restricted and began to be 
used to treat the more common mental problems of people who were more-or-less functional in 
society.16 
Though less common than it was in the early to mid-20th-century, psychoanalysis is still 
practiced today, but it has always been prohibitively expensive.  A patient of a psychoanalyst 
(then and now) might expect to be in therapy multiple times per week for several years before 
they could expect to reach satisfactory resolution of their problems.  Furthermore, to become a 
                                                          
11 Jeffrey J. Magnatavita, “Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy” in Twenty First Century Psychotherapies: Contemporary 
Approaches to Theory and Practice, ed. Jay L. Lebow (Hoboken: Wiley and Sons, 2008), 227. 
12Magnatvita, “Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy,” 215. 
13 Szasz, The Myth of Psychotherapy, 126. 
14 Mark Solms and Margaret R. Zellner, “Freudian Drive Theory Today,” in From the Couch to the Lab: Trends in 
Psychodynamic Neuroscience, ed. Aikaterini Fotopoulou, Donald Pfaff, and Martin A. Conway (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 49-63. 
15 Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Everybody Lies: Big Data, New Data, And What The Internet Can Tell Us About Who 
We Really Are (New York: Harper Collins, 2017), 45-52. 
16 Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons Inc. 1997), 170-172. 
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certified practitioner, a prospective analyst must themselves submit to extensive psychoanalysis.  
All this made psychoanalysis accessible only to the small number of patients who had the means 
to pay (a point which became important in later competitions between psychoanalysis and faster 
and less costly therapies such as CBT).  Through the establishment of regulating Psychoanalytic 
Institutes and a mass migration of psychoanalysts into America from Europe,17 by the 1930s and 
1940s, psychoanalysis expanded into a sprawling industry, with psychoanalysts practicing in 
most of the world’s major cities, and claiming nearly monopolistic control of the entire 
American mental health industry in particular.18 
Psychology and Behaviorism 
 About the same time that Freud was beginning to formulate psychoanalysis, the new 
science of Psychology was coming into being.  Wilhelm Wundt established the first experimental 
psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, followed soon after by a laboratory at Cornell 
University in America.19  Psychologists were largely skeptical of psychoanalysis.20  Unlike 
Freud, who developed his theories through introspection and reflection on individual case 
studies, psychologists attempted to understand and explain human behavior through the 
application of the experimental method.  Due largely to its emphasis on experimentation and the 
scientific method, many psychologists began to work in conscious opposition to psychoanalysis 
                                                          
17 John G. Howells, World History of Psychiatry (New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1975), 453. 
18 Philip Cushman, “Psychotherapy to 1992: A Historically Situated Interpretation,” in History of Psychotherapy: A 
Century of Change, eds.  Donald Freedheim, Herbert J. Freudenberger, Jane W. Kessler, Stanley B. Messer, Donald 
R. Peterson, Hans H. Strupp, Paul L. Wachtel(Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1992) 37-52. 
19 Daniel B. Fishman and Cyril M. Franks, “Evolution and Differentiation Within Behavior Therapy: A Theoretical and 
Epistemological Review” in History of Psychotherapy: A Century of Chang, eds. Donald Freedheim et al. 
(Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1992), 162. 
20 Edward Erwin, Behavior Therapy: Scientific Philosophical, and Moral Foundations (New York: Cambridge, 1978) 3. 
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and other forms of therapy based on introspection and intuition.21  Some began to develop a 
paradigm for understanding the human mind that eschewed the consideration of internal mental 
states entirely, contradicting many of Freud’s claims.  This paradigm came to be known as 
Behaviorism.  According to Behaviorism, the scientific study of the human mind can proceed 
only through the study of observable behaviors.22 
In addition to its opposition to psychoanalysis, there are two major reasons for the rise of 
Behaviorism in Psychology.  The first was the famous research of Russian physiologist Ivan 
Pavlov.23  The second was the rise of Philosophical Positivism in scientific research, which 
rejected the consideration of anything that could not be measured or observed.24  By restricting 
phenomena which could not be directly measured, Behaviorist Psychology eliminated internal 
mental phenomena from its scope. Behaviorists supported the view that human behavior is 
purely a function of positive and negative reinforcements and is therefore almost limitlessly 
changeable, contrary to Freud’s view which held that human behavior is motivated by primitive 
complexes and drives universal to human nature.  The Behaviorist idea was further reinforced by 
developments in American anthropology25 which emphasized theories that denied the existence 
of a universal, immutable human nature, asserting instead that people are essentially malleable, 
and devoid of stable, consistent structures of thought or behavior across time and culture.26  By 
                                                          
21 Donald Gillies, Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century: Four Central Themes (Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1993), 154-155. 
22 Erwin, Behavior Therapy, 50. 
23 Richard E. Zinbarg and James W Griffith, “Behavior Therapy” in Twenty First Century Psychotherapies: 
Contemporary Approaches to Theory and Practice, ed. Jay L. Lebow (Hoboken: Wiley and Sons, 2008), 10-11. 
24 George Graham, “Behaviorism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015) at 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/#3 
25E.g.,Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa; a Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization 
Foreword by Franz Boas (New York: W. Morrow &, 1928).  
26 Donald E. Brown, Human Universals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 143-156. 
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the mid-20thcentury, this idea of human malleability became the dominant paradigm of the social 
sciences, sometimes referred to as the “standard social science model” or SSSM.27 
Despite its truncated scope, Behaviorist Psychology produced a large body of controlled 
experimental research.  Behaviorists were able to show how a surprising variety of animal 
behaviors could be predictably and reliably trained through the controlled environmental 
conditioning and reinforcement administered by laboratory scientists.  The first landmark in this 
regard was Ivan Pavlov’s experiments with dogs wherein he accidentally discovered that he 
could train dogs to salivate at the ringing of a bell by ringing it at feeding time; he could 
additionally un-train them by ringing the bell without pairing it with food.28  This methodology 
of paring an unconditioned stimulus (i.e., food) with conditioning stimuli (i.e., a ringing bell) to 
create a conditioned response (i.e., salivation at the ringing of a bell), became known as classical 
conditioning.  This methodology opened new scientific vistas by making it possible to perform 
highly controlled experiments testing behavioral patterns with various animals under many 
different situations in a systematic and replicable way.  It was not long before these methods 
were applied directly to human subjects. 
One of the earliest behaviorists experiments on a human subject was the infamous study 
performed on a subject who has come to be known as “Little Albert.”  In this experiment, 
psychologists took Albert, an infant child, and exposed him to furry lab rats.  Initially the child 
showed no fear of the animal, but after exposure to the animal was repeatedly paired with loud 
distressing noises, Albert eventually started to wail whenever he saw a rat or other furry creature 
such as a dog or even a stuffed animal.  Experimenters were then able to desensitize Albert by 
                                                          
27 Cf. Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the 
Generation of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
28Zinbarg and Griffith, “Behavior Therapy,” 10-11. 
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exposing him to the furry creatures repeatedly in the absence of distressing stimuli, or in the 
presence of calming or pleasurable stimuli.  Many saw in this study potential implications for 
treating mental health problems such as trauma.29  This and other successes increased 
behaviorists confidence in their theories and methodology.  John Watson, a famous behaviorist 
boasted, 
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them 
up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of 
specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggarman 
and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and race of 
his ancestors.30 
 
Behaviorist psychologist B.F. Skinner expanded on the stimulus-response model.  He 
designed the “Skinner Box,” a specially designed chamber wherein he would place a rat or a 
pigeon and administer various stimuli aimed at reinforcing specific behaviors.  The box allowed 
stimuli to be administered in highly controlled environments at variable rates to test for different 
response patterns.31  Stimuli came in the form of food pellets, painful electric shocks, and various 
lights and sounds.  This kind of process came to be known as operant conditioning, or the 
gradual shaping of behavior through continual reinforcement of behaviors that approximate the 
behavioral response desired.  This form of conditioning played a large role in subsequent 
psychological research through the 20th century.32 
Behaviorist theory and research led to the creation of two highly related clinical 
therapies, Behavior Therapy and Behavior Modification.  These methods were used to treat 
                                                          
29John Watson and Rosalie Rayner, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions” Journal of Experimental Psychology 3, no. 1 
(1920), 1-14. 
30 John B. Watson, Behaviorism, Revised Edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930),82. 
31 Roger R. Hock, Forty Studies that Changed Psychology: Explorations into the History of Psychological Research 3rd 
Edition (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1999), 75. 
32 Fishman and Franks, “Evolution and Differentiation Within Behavior Therapy,” 163 
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problems such as addictions, trauma, and criminal behavior through the strict application of 
classical and operant conditioning.33  Based on studies like “Little Albert” and others, the first 
Behavioral Therapy, known as Systematic Desensitization, was formulated by Joseph Wolpe.34  
It sought to un-train traumatic and otherwise maladaptive responses to various objects and 
stimuli through progressively exposing people to them without reinforcing the maladaptive 
behavior and while reinforcing opposite behaviors.  For instance, someone traumatized in a car 
accident could gradually be exposed to cars and driving again with comfort, encouragement, and 
reinforced relaxation.  Just as Pavlov’s dogs could be un-trained to salivate at the ringing of a 
bell by repeatedly ringing the bell without reinforcing it with any natural food reinforcement, a 
person who had a trauma history that was triggered by a certain everyday event (e.g., a car horn, 
or thunder), could be gradually exposed to that stimuli in a safe environment that did not 
reinforce the traumatic response until eventually the traumatic response would extinguish itself.  
Similar treatments were used with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder with considerable success.35 
Behaviorist Psychology and Psychoanalytic Psychiatry continued to compete with one 
another into the second half of the 20th century.  Beginning in the 1940s the landscape of mental 
health research and clinical practice changed with the advent of a new paradigm known as 
Cognitivism in a series of events that have come to be known as the Cognitive Revolution.36 
The Cognitive Revolution 
                                                          
33Alan E. Kazdin, History of Behavior Modification: Experimental Foundations of Contemporary Research 
(Baltimore: University Park Press, 1978), 197-204. 
34 Joseph Wolpe, “Variants of Systematic Desensitization,” in The Practice of Behavior Therapy (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1969), 150-168. 
35 Edna Foa, “Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder,” Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 
vol. 12 (2), June 2010. 199-207. 




In short, Cognitivism is the idea that thought, affect, and behavior are all mutually 
influential.  According to Cognitivist theory internal cognitions and emotions are critical for 
understanding behavior.  Cognitivists showed that it was not only possible, but deeply 
enlightening to study internal mental states (even though they could not be directly observed).  
There were many factors involved in catalyzing the Cognitive Revolution.  For the purposes of 
this paper, I have selected the work of five scientists: Edward Tollman, Hans Eysenck, Leon 
Festinger, Albert Bandura, and Noam Chomsky. 
Edward Tollman37 was one of the first psychologists to produce experimental results that 
conflicted with the prevailing Behaviorist paradigm though his study of animal learning.  
Tollman studied the behavior of lab rats in mazes.  Through his investigations, he discovered that 
their behavior could not be explained by behavioristic principles of stimulus and response alone 
but appeared to indicate that animals must have some mental or cognitive “maps” of their terrain 
that help them navigate and choose their paths.  He concluded the rats continuously processed 
mental information and updating their mental maps regardless of stimulus reinforcement.  
Tolman concluded, 
We agree with the other school [behaviorism] that the rat in running a maze is exposed to 
stimuli and is finally led as a result of these stimuli to the responses which actually occur. 
We feel, however, that the intervening brain processes are more complicated, more 
patterned and often, pragmatically speaking, more autonomous than do the stimulus-
response psychologists [i.e. behaviorists].  Although we admit that the rat is bombarded 
by stimuli, we hold that his nervous system is surprisingly selective as to which of these 
stimuli it will let in at any given time.38  
 
                                                          
37 Since writing, I have learned that, Wolfgang Köhler, a founder of Gestalt Psychology, generated findings that 
conflicted with the behaviorist paradigm though his studies of insight-based learning in Chimpanzees. Cf. K. Jensen, 
“Memoir Wolfgang Köhler,” no date. http://wkprc.eva.mpg.de/english/files/wolfgang_koehler.htm 
38 Edward Tollman, “Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men,” The Psychological Review55, no. 4 (1948): 189-208.  
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The rodents showed signs of having internal cognitive structures which selectively prioritized 
certain stimuli over others and allowed them draw on tacit knowledge of their past experiences to 
inform their decisions in the present.  Subsequent animal research continued to support these 
findings over the following years.39 
 Our second scientist is Hans Eysenck.  His research compared the improvement of 
neurotic psychotherapy patients to neurotic patients who received no psychotherapy at all.  
Eysenck concluded that on the whole, psychotherapy as practiced in the early 1950s was 
ineffective: “The figures fail to support the hypothesis that psychotherapy facilitates the recovery 
from neurotic disorder.”40  Eysenck was a titan in the field of empirical Psychology, having 
established a reputation based on his landmark contributions to intelligence and personality 
theory in addition to work on behavior therapy.41  This research did great damage to the 
prevailing status quo in psychotherapy, and was particularly damaging to the reputation of 
psychoanalysis which was dominant in clinical practice at the time.  This research eroded 
practitioners’ confidence in the old methods in which they were trained and created room for 
new forms of psychotherapy to be attempted and studied.42 
 Our third scientist is Leon Festinger.  In the mid-1950s, Festinger presented his theory of 
Cognitive Dissonance.  Festinger theorized that people have many internal beliefs and cognition 
which play a critical role in determining behavior independent of any conditioning models.  In 
particular, he theorized that people have a natural motivation to maintain consistency among 
                                                          
39 Roger R. Hoch, Forty Studies that Changed Psychology, 113-114. 
40 Hans Eysenck, “The effects of Psychotherapy: an Evaluation,” Journal of Consulting Psychology 16(5) (1952), 323. 
41 S.J. Rachman, “Hans Eysenck’s contributions to Clinical Psychology and Behavior Therapy,” Personality and 
Individual Differences 103 (2016), 91-92. 
42 Edward Erwin, “Psychotherapy and Freudian Psychology,” in Hans Eysenck: Consensus and Controversy, eds. 
Sohan Mogdil and Celia Mogdil (Philadelphia: The Falmer Press, 1986), 179-204. 
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their beliefs and behaviors, and that when inconsistencies do arise, people will try to resolve 
them by changing either their beliefs or behaviors to re-establish consistency.   
 “The Basic Hypotheses I wish to state are as follows: 
1.  The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the 
person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.   
2.  When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively 
avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.”43 
 
His most famous experiment investigated how dissonance can cause self-deception.44  
The experiment involved two groups of subjects.  In one group, each subject would come into a 
lab and perform boring, pointless tasks for a period of time.  When the time was up, they were 
told that they were engaging in an experiment on how expectations influence performance.  The 
experimenter then told them that he needed the subject to tell the next person in the waiting area 
outside the lab (who was actually a confederate pretending to be a subject) that the experiment 
was a lot of fun and offered the subject $20 (a substantial amount in the 1950s) to do so.  The 
second group was the same, except they were offered only $1 to tell the next person in line that 
the experiment was a lot of fun.  Finally, Festinger had the subjects come in for a debriefing and 
asked them whether they had in fact enjoyed the tasks in the experiment.  Unexpectedly, the 
group that was paid more said they had not enjoyed the tasks, but the group that was paid only $1 
said they did enjoy them and were even willing to volunteer to do similar tasks in the future. 
 Festinger theorized that the person paid $20 had no difficulty being honest in the final 
debriefing because they were paid enough money so that when they told the confederate in the 
                                                          
43 Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University press, 1962), 3. 
44 Leon Festinger and James M. Carlsmith, “Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance,” The Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology 58, no. 2 (1959), 203-210. 
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waiting area that the task was fun, they understood that they were only saying this for the money 
and not because they actually found the tasks fun.  But the group that had received only $1 did 
not have this excuse for lying and saying that they had enjoyed the tasks, so they experienced 
dissonance.  They had to make sense of why they would tell someone that something was fun 
which they actually found boring.  To resolve this unpleasant discrepancy, the $1 subjects simply 
changed their mind.  This landmark experiment in Psychology explained a significant behavioral 
change in terms of cognitive mechanisms. 
 Our fourth scientist is Albert Bandura.  Bandura’s research gave rise to an entire field 
within psychological research called “social cognitivism.”  Badura’s most famous experiment, 
now fondly remembered as “The Bobo Doll Experiment,” demonstrated that children who 
simply watch videos of actors performing aggressive behaviors are far more likely to engage in 
the behaviors they see the actors perform (monkey-see-monkey-do).  Specifically, children who 
were shown videos of adults violently beating a Bobo Doll toy were more prone to be violent 
with the toy when they were shown violent behaviors than when they were shown neutral 
behaviors.  The violent behaviors tended to generalize beyond just the specific behaviors 
performed by the models, and male children were shown to be far more sensitive to learning 
aggressive behaviors by imitation than female children.  This important change in behavior was 
difficult to square with the Stimulus-Response models proposed by the behaviorists at the time, 
and did not cohere well with theories of human malleability which downplayed the influence of 
biological sex differences in human psychology.45  Instead, Bandura proposed a theory which 
gave room for “vicarious learning” through observation and symbolic representations. 
                                                          
45 Albert Bandura, Dorothea Ross, and Sheila A. Ross, “Imitation of Film-Mediated Aggressive Models” Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology 66, No.1(1963), 3-11. 
15 
 
A theory that denies that thoughts can regulate actions does not lend itself readily to the 
explanation of complex human behavior.  Although cognitive activities are disavowed in 
the operant conditioning framework, their role in causal sequences simply cannot be 
eliminated.  Therefore, adherents of operant theory translate cognitive operations into 
behavioristic terms, and ascribe their effects to the direct action of external events… In 
the social learning view, people are neither driven by inner forces nor buffeted by 
environmental stimuli.  Rather, psychological functioning is explained in terms of a 
continuous reciprocal interaction of personal and environmental determinants.  Within 
this approach, symbolic, vicarious, and self-regulatory processes assume a prominent 
role.46 
 
The idea that symbols can precipitate learning and behavioral change, and that people can learn 
vicariously did not fit well into a reductive stimulus-response paradigm.  Bandura’s alternative 
social-cognitive theories became highly influential for the entire field of Psychology.47 
Our fifth and final scientist is Noam Chomsky.  Chomsky and other linguists, through a 
combination of experimental methods and analysis of the natural use of language, began to 
discover that certain consistent structures which they called grammars were common to all 
human language.  This discovery seemed to evade explanation on the ground of behavioristic 
principles.  Stephen Pinker, a student of Chomsky, summarizes the influence of Chomsky’s 
findings: 
In the 1950s the social sciences were dominated by behaviorism, the school of thought 
popularized by John Watson and B.F. Skinner.  Mental terms like “know” and “think” 
were branded as unscientific; “mind” and “innate” were dirty words… But Chomsky 
called attention to two fundamental facts about language.  First, virtually every sentence 
that a person utters or understands is a brand-new combination of words, appearing for 
the first time in the history of the universe.  Therefore a language cannot be a repertoire 
of responses; the brain must contain a recipe or program that can build an unlimited set of 
sentences out of a finite list of words.  That program may be called a grammar…  The 
second fundamental fact is that children develop these complex grammars rapidly and 
without formal instruction and grow up to give consistent interpretations to novel 
sentence constructions that they have never before encountered.  Therefore, he argued, 
children must innately be equipped with a plan common to the grammars of all 
                                                          
46 Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1977), 10-12. 
47Stephen J. Haggbloom, et al. “The 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century,” Review of General 
Psychology 6, no. 2 (2002) 139-152. 
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languages, a Universal Grammar, that tells them how to distill the syntactic patterns out 
of the speech of their parents.48 
 
In a highly influential and scathing review of behaviorist B.F. Skinner’s book Beyond 
Freedom and Dignity, Chomsky took Skinner and Behaviorism to task.  Chomsky accuses 
Skinner of imposing “certain arbitrary limitations on scientific research which virtually 
guarantee continued failure,”49  and of purveying theories that are “vacuous,” and “pure 
dogmatism.”   Chomsky was especially sensitive to the political ramifications of Behaviorist 
theory, and worried that they would be used to justify fascist power structures that use public 
policy as a means to control citizens, “There is little doubt that a theory of human malleability 
might be put to the service of totalitarian doctrine.  If, indeed freedom and dignity are merely 
relics of outdated mystical beliefs, then what objection can there be to narrow and effective 
controls instituted to ensure ‘the survival of a culture’?”50  A public debate ensued between 
Chomsky and Skinner.51  Though there was no formal winner in this debate, the credibility and 
dominance of strict Behaviorism as a science was diminished, opening the field for new ideas 
and avenues of study and practice. 
 Tollman, Eysenck, Festinger, Bandura and Chomsky were just a few of the major players 
who contributed to the decline of behaviorism and psychoanalysis, and the concomitant rise of 
Cognitivism.  As more scientists began subscribing to Cognitivist views the battle between 
Behaviorist psychology and psychoanalytic psychiatry petered out.  Behaviorism’s theory and 
methodology were shown to be insufficient and psychoanalysis continually drew criticism for its 
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lack of experimental support or demonstrable clinical efficacy.52  Psychoanalysts had increasing 
difficulty justifying their claim that only medical doctors should be allowed to practice 
psychotherapy, and eventually Psychologists, Social Workers, and other professions were 
admitted into the field of clinical psychotherapy as well.53  This created an influx of new 
psychotherapists into the field of clinical practice with a wide variety of new approaches.54  
Some of these approaches were completely independent of preceding paradigms, such as the 
Person-Centered approach devised by Carl Rogers.55  But some new therapies were clearly 
connected to the new paradigm.  The first person to create such a therapy was Albert Ellis. 
Ellis, Beck, and Linehan: Rational, Cognitive, and Dialectical Therapies 
Albert Ellis is the founder of Rational Therapy (now known as Rational Emotive 
Behavioral Therapy, REBT).  Like Freud and Carl Rogers, the inspiration for Ellis’s new form of 
therapy came more from his experience and intuition than as an application of clinical or 
experimental research.  Nonetheless, connections between Ellis’s therapy and cognitivist 
psychology are self-evident, as we shall see.   
Ellis suffered from intense social anxiety early in life.56  An avid reader of Philosophy, he 
discovered that reading the Stoic philosopher Epictetus helped him to overcome his problems.  
What he learned from Epictetus was that by translating his emotions into verbal statements that 
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made definite truth claims, and then disputing those truth claims, he could gain control of his 
emotions and significantly reduce his distress.57 
Originally, Ellis had been trained in psychoanalysis, but he quickly became dissatisfied 
with the results it gave to him and his patients.58  As an alternative, he began to use the Stoic 
principles that he had used treat his own anxiety with his clients.  He found that this approach 
was more efficient and more effective, they too were able to increase the control they had over 
their emotions by identifying and disputing the tacitly held beliefs that were sustaining their 
problems.  Ellis developed these observations into his own theory and method of psychotherapy 
and called it Rational Therapy (RT).  Ellis describes his therapy: 
The central theme of Rational Therapy (RT) is that man is a uniquely rational as well as 
uniquely irrational, animal; that his emotional or psychological disturbances are largely 
the result of his thinking illogically or irrationally; and that he can rid himself of most of 
his emotional or mental unhappiness, ineffectuality, and disturbance if he learns to 
maximize his rational and minimize his irrational thinking.  It is the task of the 
psychotherapist to work with individuals who are needlessly unhappy and troubled, or 
who are weighed down with intense anxiety or hostility, and to show them (a) that their 
difficulties largely result from distorted perception and illogical thinking, and (b) that 
there is a relatively simple, though work-requiring, method of re-ordering their 
perceptions and reorganizing their thinking so as to remove the basic cause of their 
difficulties.59 
 
In RT, the client need not spend endless hours rehashing childhood misgivings (a la 
Freud), or be placed into a reinforcement regimen (a la Behaviorism).  Instead, the client could 
take control over his or her own healing process quickly and effectively by observing and 
rationally challenging his or her own emotionally-charged thoughts in real time.  Ellis devised a 
simple but powerful technique to help people quickly learn how to practice Rational Therapy on 
themselves.  Ellis summarizes this technique, 
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Sparked by philosophy, I worked on my psychotherapeutic theory from 1953 to 1955 and 
finally came up with what I called Rational Therapy (RT) in January 1955.  In it, I 
presented the rather unique ABC theory of emotional disturbance.  This held that when 
people were confronted with Adversity (A) and reacted with disturbed Consequences (C), 
such as severe anxiety and depression, it was largely their Belief System (B), together 
with A, that led to their dysfunctions.  Thus A x B = C.  This theory significantly differed 
from psychoanalytic, conditioning, and other theories of emotional disturbance that were 
popular in 1955. 60 
 
To illustrate the A-B-C technique, one may consider the case of an alcoholic.  The 
alcoholic experiences stress and a strong desire to drink (A).  In the end, he gives in to this 
pressure and falls back into his addiction (C).  In between A and C is his belief (B): “I must have 
a drink.”  Ellis would treat this person by arguing against the B: “What evidence is there that you 
must have a drink?  Will the world end if you don’t have a drink?  Will you die?  Might there be 
any benefit to you not having a drink?”  By eroding the man’s confidence in this irrational belief 
and replacing it with more nuanced, rational beliefs like “I am really tempted to drink right now, 
but it will probably be harmful.  It may be uncomfortable right now, but I can survive without 
it,” the man is expected to have less stress and greater control over his drinking habits.   
Ellis believed that most emotional and behavioral problems could be explained as the 
result of patterns of well-rehearsed or tacitly accepted belief statements like the ones above.  
Ellis noted that this process happens similarly in animals and human, but that humans have a 
stronger capacity for “self-signaling.” He writes, “For whereas the Pavlovian dog is obviously 
able to signal himself on some rudimentary level, once the bell is rung in juxtaposition with the 
meat he enjoys eating, and to convince himself that the sound of the bell equals eating time (and 
in the extinguishing process, that the sound of the bell without the presentation of food equals 
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non-eating time), his self-signaling tends to be very limited and largely to be at the mercy of 
outside circumstances.”61In RT, patients repeatedly and vigilantly practice noticing the 
momentary beliefs underlying emotions and behaviors, holding them up to rigorous scrutiny, and 
searching for more rational alternatives. 
Ellis was certainly not the first to discover how helpful Stoic Philosophy could be to 
those suffering from psychological distress.  Stoics like Epictetus and Seneca had inspired an 
earlier generation of psychotherapists.  Very early in the 20th century, French therapists such as 
Paul Dubois and Charles Badouin openly quoted and prescribed Stoic texts including the 
Enchiridion as a treatment of choice for many of their patients.62  The similarity between Ellis’s 
method and these earlier psychotherapists’ has been noted by Ellis himself, though unlike Ellis 
Dubois and Badouin were working during the hey-days of Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism, 
which may explain why their work never gained the audience and appeal that Ellis’s did. 
Very soon after Ellis developed RT, Aaron Beck, a Psychiatrist, developed his own form 
of cognitive therapy.  Like Ellis, Beck was originally trained in Psychoanalysis, but was 
dissatisfied with the progress of his patients.  Looking to improve his methods, Beck studied his 
patients and began to subject to empirical scrutiny some of the psychoanalytic theories he had 
been taught.  Judith S. Beck summarizes the story: 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s. Dr. Beck decided to test the psycho-analytic concept 
that depression is the result of hostility turned inward towards the self.  He investigated 
the dreams of depressed patients, which, he predicted, would manifest greater themes of 
hostility than the dreams of normal controls.  To his surprise, he ultimately found that the 
dreams of depressed patients contained fewer themes of hostility and far greater themes 
of defectiveness deprivation, and loss.  He recognized that these themes paralleled his 
patients’ thinking when they were awake.  The results of other studies Beck conducted 
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led him to believe that a related psychoanalytic idea – that depressed patients have a need 
to suffer – might be inaccurate…  At that point it was almost as if a stacked row of 
dominoes began to fall.  If these psychoanalytic concepts were not valid, how else could 
depression be understood? 
As Dr. Beck listened to his patients on the couch, he realized that they occasionally 
reported two streams of thinking: a free-association stream and quick, evaluative thoughts 
about themselves.  One woman, for example, detailed her sexual exploits.  She then 
reported feeling anxious.  Dr. Beck made an interpretation: “You thought I was 
criticizing you.”  The patient disagreed: “No, I was afraid I was boring you.”  Upon 
questioning his other depression patients, Dr. Beck recognized that all of them 
experienced “automatic” negative thoughts such as these, and that this second stream of 
thoughts was closely tied to their emotions.  He began to help his patients identify, 
evaluate, and respond to their unrealistic and maladaptive thinking.  When he did so, they 
rapidly improved.63 
 
Beck came to believe, contrary to his Psychoanalytic training, that it was not unconscious 
drives and unresolved childhood crises that fueled patients’ depression, but specific, present-
tense ways of thinking about themselves and the world.  Beck called his therapy Cognitive 
Therapy (CT).  Like Ellis, Beck also attributed his insights to the teachings of the Stoics, 
Nevertheless, the philosophical underpinnings of this approach go back thousands of 
years, certainty to the time of the Stoics, who considered man’s conceptions (or 
misconceptions) of events rather than the events themselves as the key to his emotional 
upsets.  This new approach – cognitive therapy – suggests that the individual’s problems 
are derived largely from certain distortions of reality based on erroneous premises and 
assumptions.  These incorrect conceptions originated in defective learning during the 
person’s cognitive development.  Regardless of their origin, it is relatively simple to state 
the formula for treatment: The therapist helps a patient to unravel his distortions in 
thinking and to learn alternative, more realistic ways to formulate his experiences.64 
 
Beck’s CT and Ellis’s RT were very similar in their theories and methods.  Ellis and Beck 
acknowledged these similarities.65 
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As Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism waned, and interest in new therapeutic approaches 
grew, publications and trainings for the new therapies spread rapidly.  Although some 
behaviorists vehemently opposed the induction of any “mentalist”66 concepts into behavioral 
therapy, in practice, behavioral therapists and cognitive therapists often borrow techniques from 
one another.67  Behaviorists argued that cognitivism implied a metaphysical mind-body dualism, 
which they charged was unscientific, as B.F. Skinner lamented, “By attempting to move human 
behavior into a world of nonphysical dimensions, mentalistic or cognitive psychologists have 
cast the basic issues in insoluble forms.  They have also probably cost us much useful 
evidence…”68  Notwithstanding, the borrowing and integration of techniques persisted, and 
prominent behavioral psychologists such as Hans Eysenck and Joseph Wolpe lent their support 
for an integration of cognitive and behavioral approaches to understanding and treating 
behavioral problems.  Eysenck writes, 
It is our conviction that stimulus-based and representation-based accounts are necessary 
for any adequate explanation of behavior.  But it would be wrong to equate conditioning 
explanations solely with stimulus control and cognitive theory with representational 
knowledge structures.  It would be equally inappropriate to oppose a theory of conscious 
control with one that emphasizes unconscious processes.  Far from being a matter of 
simple competition between conditioning and cognitive accounts, or between conscious 
and unconscious processes, the approach we wish to adopt emphasizes points of 
integration and investigated the nature of the interaction between them rather than 
assuming total dissociation.69 
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CT and RT eventually blended with Behaviorist principles of operant and classical conditioning, 
resulting in Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) and Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy 
(CBT).  Eventually, even B.F. Skinner, the stalwart opponent of what he called “mentalism” 
adapted his theories to account for the importance of internal thoughts and emotions as biological 
processes embedded into observable behavior.70  Presently, therapies based on the basic insights 
of Ellis, Beck, and the Behaviorists–i.e. that emotional and behavioral change can be 
accomplished though mental change and vice versa – are commonly lumped together under the 
umbrella term “Cognitive-Behavioral Therapies.”71 
CBT has continued to be studied and adapted by researchers and clinicians to treat a 
growing range of problems and continues to prove its effectiveness.  It is currently the most 
widely practiced and most widely applicable form of psychotherapy today.72  It has been proven 
effective in treating difficult problems such as criminal behavior,73 addiction, anxiety, Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorders, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and many other problems.74  A number of 
studies have concluded that of CBT can be as effective or more effective than medications.75  
Perhaps CBT’s greatest success is the therapy developed by Psychologist Marsha Linehan 
known as Dialectical Behavioral Therapy or DBT.  Linehan was a therapist working with 
patients diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), a notoriously complex and 
difficult to treat diagnosis.  Patients with BPD often present with extreme emotional sensitivity 
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and a very high risk of self-destructive behaviors and suicide.  Prior to the creation of DBT, there 
was no proven treatment for BPD.76Linehan took many of the tried-and-true principles of CBT, 
and adapted them to work with the unique problems of BPD patients. 
“Although DBT borrows many principles and procedures from standard cognitive and 
behavioral therapies, the development and evolution of DBT over time came about as I 
tried – and in many ways failed – to get standard CBT to work with the population of 
clients I was treating.  Each modification I made came about as I was trying to solve 
specific problems I could not solve with the standard CBT interventions available at the 
time.  These modifications have led to DBT’s emphasizing 10 areas that, though not new, 
had not previously received as much attention in traditional CBT applications…  Many, if 
not most, of these are now common in many CBT interventions.77 
 
The most significant adaptation which DBT adds to CBT is the emphasis on dialectical 
processes.  In DBT treatment focuses on the importance of paradox and the synthesis of opposite 
extremes.  For example, while standard CBT is focused on helping patients change their thoughts 
and behaviors and solve their problems, DBT alternates between helping patients change and 
helping them accept themselves as they are, sometimes without change.  The paradox or 
synthesis of change with acceptance is the central concept that gives DBT its name.78  At present, 
DBT is the treatment-of-choice for BPD and other disorders that are considered especially 
difficult to treat. 
The Moral Shortcomings of CBT 
CBT is not without its problems.  In particular, it is morally deficient in thatit fails to 
include any conceptualization of human flourishing.  Some conceptualization of human 
flourishing is necessary in any kind of medicinal treatment.  The treatment for diabetes, for 
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example, involves adding either insulin or sugar into the bloodstream.  Whether to add insulin or 
sugar, however, depends upon one’s conceptualization of normative blood-sugar levels.  A 
doctor with an incorrect conceptualization could end up harming the patient.  Likewise, CBT 
works by helping people substitute distress-causing beliefs and behaviors for less distress-
causing beliefs and behaviors.  But distressing psychological symptoms may have a variety of 
beliefs underlying those symptoms, and the therapist must determine which belief is 
pathological, and what alternative beliefs are healthy.  Without any account of what thoughts and 
beliefs humans ought to have, CBT is in a precarious moral position: the patient and practitioner 
must decide for themselves what constitutes normative and pathological beliefs and behaviors. 
As Father Alexis Trader points out, “[Albert] Ellis claims that there is not such thing as right and 
wrong, or even good and bad, but only thoughts, feelings, and actions that further or sabotage 
one’s goals and purposes, which ultimately translate into maximizing the amount of pleasure a 
person receives in life.”79  This would be like treating diabetes with sugar or insulin by arbitrarily 
injecting one or the other without any objective understanding of healthy blood-sugar or blood-
insulin levels.  A thoroughly narcissistic patient, for instance, might not wish to feel guilt for 
cheating or abusing others.  But therapist may treat this patient by resolving the distress through 
helping him or her overcome their feelings of guilt, but in the long-run such an arrangement is 
likely to cause more harm than good.  A conceptualization mental and behavioral normativity is 
required to help guide the therapist and patient to correctly identify which issues as pathological. 
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CBT’s lack of any integrated concept of normativity in human psychology has led to 
concerns, especially among Christian counselors.  One standard text on Christian Counseling 
describes the problem in detail: 
Because cognitive therapy lacks a comprehensive personality theory that accounts for 
human motivation, it also tends to be sketchy about defining normalcy and abnormalcy…  
cognitive therapy is characterized by what Woolfolk and Richardson (1984) call 
‘amorality,’ a tendency to go along with the individual definitions of normalcy and 
abnormalcy.  If a client comes into a clinic complaining that a pattern is a problem, then 
for that person it is a problem.  This usually meshes well with common sense.  No one is 
going to disagree that agoraphobia or suicidal depression is abnormal.  But it leaves open 
to the individual decision of the therapist and client the normalcy or abnormalcy of 
various adjustment problems. 
A perhaps extreme example is Lazarus’s (1980) work with a woman who reported 
having married her husband only for the financial rewards he gave her.  She had had 
numerous sexual affairs.  She came to therapy because of a developing aversion to sexual 
relations with her husband.  Lazarus’s response was not to confront the obvious 
narcissism of the client or to urge her to work on the marriage.  Rather he deemed her 
aversion to sex in a loveless and pragmatic marriage a worthwhile target for therapy and 
taught her cognitive techniques to allow her to ‘turn herself off emotionally’ so that she 
could continue to tolerate sex with her husband while continuing to enjoy her adulterous 
affairs.  While this is an extreme example, it points to the risks of an obscure definition of 
normalcy”80  
 
 One may argue that this is an extreme example that is not representative of CBT as a 
whole.  But on the contrary, this basic point has been raised by some philosophers as a problem 
not just with CBT, but with modern psychotherapy in general.  Philip Rieff, Thomas Szasz, and 
Alasdair MacIntyre81 have all argued that psychotherapy’s failure to explicate its moral 
implications has led it to become an insidious force for manipulation, subtly usurping and 
privatizing the role of other cultural institutions in the lives of large numbers of patients.  
Sociologically this results in the development psychotherapeutic communities and institutions 
that behave as de facto religions.  Such an effect has far-reaching moral and sociological 
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consequences that threaten the integrity of explicitly religious institutions in particular.82  Rieff 
has argued that psychotherapy is only as moral as the culture in which it is being practiced, 
Ultimately, it is the community that cures.  The function of the classical therapist is to 
commit the patient to the symbol system of the community, as best he can and by 
whatever techniques are sanctioned (e.g., ritual or dialectical, magical or rational).  All 
such efforts to reintegrate the subject into the communal system may be categorized as 
“commitment therapies.”  Behind shaman and priest, philosopher and physician, stand the 
great community as the ultimate corrective of personal disorders.  Culture is the system 
of significances attached to behavior by which a society explains itself to itself.  A culture 
that is not thus self-explicative must be undergoing, in the measure of the negative 
condition, a profound change.  What happens, however, if the community itself is 
disordered?”83 
 
The wide-spread privatization of the moral components of this treatment process leads to a 
subjectification of morality in the culture – creating exactly the kind of disordered community 
that loses the power to heal. 
One might still argue that other common medicinal treatments are not expected to contain 
intrinsic theories of normative biological functioning, and so it is not reasonable to expect this of 
psychotherapy.  For example, in the treatment of diabetes, there is no relationship between the 
tools of treatment and the morals of the treatment.  But other medical treatments do not have 
moral implications in the same way that psychotherapeutic treatments do.  The very nature of 
psychotherapy requires it to have moral implications.  In a classic text on the topic, Perry London 
admits this much, even defending this as the professional status quo of psychotherapists: 
It is probably correct to declare that every aspect of psychotherapy presupposes some 
implicit moral doctrine, but it is not necessary to seek this level in order to say why it is 
important for therapists to recognize the moral concomitants of patients’ problems and 
the implied moral position of some of their solutions.  Some problems are inevitably 
moral ones from the perspective of either client or therapist, and some can be viewed as 
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strategic or technical ones and treated without reference to particular value systems.  In 
the one case, the therapist must fulfill a moral agency in order to function at all, whereas, 
in the other he may restrict himself to the impartial helping or contractual function with 
which he is usually identified.  But if he does not know the difference, then his own 
moral commitments may influence his technical functioning so that he willy-nilly strives 
to mold men to his own image, or his technical acts may imply moral positions which he 
might himself abhor.84 
 
 As London asserts, it may not be strictly necessary to resolve the fundamental moral 
dilemmas of psychotherapy as a prerequisite to effective and ethical clinical work, nonetheless, 
his very argument illustrates the precarious moral position of the therapist. How can it be that a 
therapist has an obligation to “fulfill a moral agency,” and it not be necessary for them to 
recognize the “implied moral positions of some of their solutions?”  Psychotherapy appears to be 
on shaky moral ground. 
Psychotherapists who use such therapies have needed to supplement them with forms of 
moral reasoning from sources outside of the psychotherapies themselves.85In fact, the 
professions which are licensed to practice psychotherapy (in the United States these are 
Psychiatrists, Psychiatric Nurses, Psychologists, Social Workers, Marriage and Family 
Therapists, and Professional Counselors) are generally expected to develop their own clinical 
judgement on such matters.86This creates a major risk for psychotherapists on the whole, as it 
places within the realm of the subjective judgement of the therapist and patient, decisions 
involving deep philosophical problems that are outside the scope of most psychotherapeutic 
training programs.  Unlike the practice of modern medicine, which relies on the discipline of 
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Bioethics for moral guidance, there is no analogous discipline guiding the practice of 
psychotherapy. 
There is no inherent barrier to a psychotherapy having an integrated conceptualization of 
human flourishing, indeed some psychotherapies are built around such conceptualizations.87But 
is it possible for CBT to be built this way?  As we have seen, CBT was inspired by Stoic thought 
and practice, but unlike modern CBT, the Stoics placed emphasis on the moral dimensions of 
their ancient form of psychotherapy.  Thomas Szasz points out, 
The idea that the philosopher’s function is to be a physician of the soul is taken for 
granted by many post-Socratic philosophers, especially by the Stoics.  Cicero (106-43 
B.C.) provides what may be one of the earliest articulations of the idea that the person 
suffering from a sick soul cannot be his own healer but must entrust himself to the care of 
an expert: “The soul that is sick cannot rightly prescribe for itself, except by following 
the instruction of wise men.”  These wise men, or physicians of the soul, should, of 
course, be philosophers, experts in the use of words.  In summarizing the duties of 
comforters of the soul, Cicero recommends the use of “healing words,” what Aeschylus 
(ca. 525-456 B.C.) called iatro logoi.  Veritably, like pure water issuing from a spring 
that becomes contaminated as it courses downstream toward the oceans, we see 
psychotherapy as healing rhetoric here in its pristine purity, before it becomes 
contaminated and unfit for its function as it courses through history and empties into 
modern medicine.88 
 
Unlike modern CBT, the Stoic forms of cognitive therapy were embedded in a broader theory of 
the Natural Law.  Is it possible for CBT to import these concepts?  If so, what might such a CBT 
look like? 
In the next chapter I summarize the doctrines of the Stoics and the role that Natural Law 
played in their thought, including their use of ancient cognitive therapy.  In chapter three I  argue 
that early Christians were also profoundly influenced by Stoic thought and adapted Stoic forms 
of cognitive therapy to suite their theistic and messianic world view.  I also argue that the 
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Christian appropriation of Stoic thought in this regard, unlike the appropriation of Stoic though 
by modern CBT, retained the Stoic norms for guiding therapeutic practice, and therefore avoided 
the moral problem of modern psychotherapy discussed in this chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapies originated in the mid-20thcentury out of conflict between 
behavioristic and Freudian schools of thought.  The new therapies were directly inspired by 
ancient Stoic philosophy, and supplanted both Freudian psychoanalysis and Behaviorism to 
become the dominant form of psychotherapy used in clinical practice by the end of the 20th 
century.  Though offering powerful and proven techniques for helping people overcome or deal 
with problems, CBT, like many other psychotherapies, lacks a moral center and offers no explicit 
guidance as to how these tools and techniques ought to be applied.  However, the Stoics whose 
philosophy inspired the development of Cognitive Therapies did include a theory of human 
flourishing that informed their application of cognitive therapeutic techniques, and the moral 
problems of modern CBT may represent another opportunity to learn from these ancient thinkers.  









Chapter 2: Stoicism 
 This chapter will present a general overview of Stoicism.  The thrust of this chapter is 
that the Stoics practiced cognitive therapy89 within the context of a broader conceptualization of 
human flourishing which they called Natural Law. 
Stoicism is an ancient Graeco-Roman school of philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium.  
It flourished from approximately 300 BC to 300 AD.  Its hallmark teaching is that Philosophy’s 
ultimate purpose is to help people reach moral perfection by overcoming emotional weaknesses 
through the exercise of reason.90Its main contribution to current psychotherapy was the idea that 
emotions can be formulated as propositional beliefs.91  Inspired by this insight, modern cognitive 
therapists such as Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck developed systems of psychotherapy to help 
people overcome emotional distress by refuting the beliefs that undergirded their negative 
emotions.  But while modern cognitive therapies generally lack any normative theory of human 
flourishing, as pointed out in chapter one, the Stoics considered cognitive self-regulation as 
inseparable from a metaphysical worldview replete with normativity. 
After the trial and execution of Socrates, philosophy flourished in Athens.  New 
philosophical schools were established, each with a unique worldview and style of 
argumentation.  Plato founded the Academy, Aristotle founded the Lyceum, Epicurus founded 
the Garden, and so on.  The Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium and takes its name 
                                                          
89 While some may argue that the use of the term “cognitive therapy” in this case is an anachronism, authoritative 
scholars of Stoicism often freely employ the term as it aptly describes their most characteristic practices.  Cf. 
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University Press, 1994) and Margaret Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).  In 
this chapter and the next I will refer to use the words ‘cognitive therapy’ or ‘cognitive intervention’ to refer in a 
generic way to the cognitive techniques and practices ancient Greeks and Christians used to achieve emotional 
self-mastery and alleviate distress. 
90Martha Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” Apeiron 20, no. 2 (1987), 129. 
91Graver, Stoicism and Emotion, 4. 
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from the Stoa Poikile, or “Painted Colonnade” in Athens where Zeno and his students met to 
discuss philosophical questions. 
Zeno was originally trained in Cynicism, another philosophy of the time, by his mentor 
Crates.92  The philosophy which Zeno came to develop had much in common with that of his 
teacher.  Both philosophies emphasized the importance of self-mastery and trained people to 
overcome their desires for comfort and pleasure, as well as their fears of pain and hardship.  But 
their motives were different.  For the Cynics, self-mastery was an expression of their disdain and 
disregard for social conventions, 
The Cynics break with the world … was radical.  They rejected what most people 
considered the elementary rules and indispensable conditions for life in society: 
cleanliness, pleasant appearance, and courtesy.  They practiced deliberate shamelessness 
– masturbating in public, like Diogenes or making love in public, like Crates and 
Hipparchia.  The Cynics were absolutely unconcerned with social proprieties and 
opinion; they despised money, did not hesitate to beg, and avoided seeking stable 
positions within the city.  …  They did not fear the powerful, and always expressed 
themselves with provocative freedom of speech.93 
 
Their ideal was to be utterly self-reliant and heedless of wealth, privilege, social standing, or 
material well-being.  It was believed that these things only hindered someone from the one true 
good: living in complete harmony with Nature.94  Their disrespect for commonly accepted social 
conventions led some to insultingly refer to them as “cynics” derived from “kyne,” the Greek 
word for dog. 
But while the Cynics held that wealth, possessions, and social conventions necessarily 
prevented one from living in accordance with Nature, the Stoics believed that they could be 
                                                          
92 David Sedley, “The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. Brad 
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93Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?. trans. Michael Chase (Harmondsworth: Penguine, 2002), 109. Cited in 
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brought into harmony with it, so long as one maintained detachment or indifference to these 
things.  This idea became very important for the Stoics, and is now referred to as the doctrine of 
indifferent things.95  Epictetus illustrates this doctrine in his Discourses: 
“Epictetus, we can no longer stand being tied to this hateful body, giving it food and 
drink, resting it and cleaning it, and having to associate with all manner of uncongenial 
people for its sake.”  Such things are indifferent are they not, and as nothing to us; and 
death no evil thing?  Aren’t we akin to God, having come from him?  Let us go home, 
then to be free finally, from the shackles that restrain us and weigh us down.  Here we 
find robbers and thieves, and law-courts, and so-called despots who imagine that they 
wield some power over us precisely because of our body and its possessions.  Allow us to 
show them that they have power over precisely no one.”96 
 
The ascetic rigors of Cynicism made it something to which few were willing to aspire, 
especially the affluent classes who prized their wealth and social standing.  Many Stoics, on the 
other hand, were among the most wealthy and influential people in the Roman Empire.  Their 
practiced indifference to material wealth and social standing is illustrated by the roster of 
influential Stoic philosophers which includes Emperor Marcus Aurelius and the Roman senator 
Seneca alongside Epictetus, a freed slave. 
The Stoic idea of Nature was deeply theological.  They believed in God, conceived of as 
a supremely rational, omni-present, and benevolent being who created and cares for humanity, 
and governs all events and all movements of matter in the Universe bringing it ever closer to 
perfection.  They had counter-arguments to common objections to the existence of a provident 
God, such as the Problem of Evil.97  The importance of theology to Stoicism therefore cannot be 
                                                          
95Nicholas P. White, “Stoic Values” in The Monist 73, no. 1 (1990), 42-58 
96Epictetus, discourses Book I, 9:12 in Discourses and Selected Writings, trans. And ed. Robert Dobbin (New York: 
Penguin, 2008), 26. 
97 A.A. Long, “Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action” in Problems in Stoicism ed. A.A. 
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understated: “The existence of God, or what comes to the same thing in Stoicism, the divinity of 
Nature, is a thesis which the Stoics devoted great energy to proving.”98 
For them, God was the Logos, or the literal personification of perfect reason, the 
primordial and cosmic rational principle which governs all things.  They were not Theists, like 
Jews, Christians, or Muslims, but Pantheists.  Their conception of God was materialistic.99  For 
them “God,” “Nature,” and “the Universe” were all synonyms, “God is one and the same with 
Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names.”100  For them the whole Universe 
was the personal and physical embodiment of God, which God providentially directed down to 
the smallest bits of matter.  The human soul was also material, which they called Pneuma due to 
their beliefs that the air was the essence of life.101  The Pneuma was the seat of human reason, 
the possession of which made them a shareholder of divinity, granting humanity with intrinsic 
dignity, and making moral perfection possible.102  This is seen in the opening of Epictetus’s 
Discourses: 
“Well, what does Zeus say?  ‘Epictetus, if it were possible I would have made your little 
body and possessions both free and unrestricted.  As it is, though, make no mistake: this 
body does not belong to you, it is only cunningly constructed clay.  And since I could not 
make the body yours I have given you a portion of myself instead, the power of positive 
and negative impulse, of desire and aversion – the power, in other words, of making good 
use of impressions.  If you take care of it and identify with it, you will never be blocked 
or frustrated; you won’t have to complain, and never will need to blame or flatter anyone.  
Is that enough to satisfy you?”103 
 
                                                          
98 A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 149. 
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In addition to cosmic Logos, or Nature writ large, each being or object in the universe has 
its own particular nature,104 writ small, which governs its behavior.  For most objects the 
governance of cosmic Nature entails strict determinism, such as with the behavior of chemical 
compounds or of irrational animals.  But for human beings, whose nature is to be rational, there 
is free will.  The Stoics did not conceive of this free will as a complete and immediate control 
over one’s behaviors.  Instead, they argued that man can have complete control only over his 
own character or soul, and since all human behaviors are a function of one’s soul, one can have 
free will via the control one exercises over their own soul.105 
They explained this by an analogy with geometry.  Objects will roll down a hill or when 
pushed according to their shape: e.g. an egg will roll differently from a cylinder.  For human 
beings, the shape (so to speak) of one’s soul is one’s character.  Though the influence of nature 
must be heeded as gravity causing an object to roll downhill, a person has control of the “shape” 
of their soul, and therefore over the way they “roll” in response to the pressures of nature.  
Through shaping one’s own soul, one may gain control over how he or she responds to certain 
circumstances, not as a direct and absolute power, since everything must act in accordance with 
his nature at all times106, but as an indirect power.  As Cicero wrote, citing Chryssipus, 
Chrysippus offers an analogy to the round shape or “rollability’ of some cylindrical 
object.  When given a push, a cylindrical object will roll forward; another shape will 
behave differently or not move at all.  In trying to explain why the cylinder rolls while the 
other object does not, it hardly seems right to single out the pushing motion, since a very 
similar push does not yield anything like the same result in the other object.  Chrysippus 
therefore finds it reasonable to designate the push a ‘proximate’ or ‘accessory’ cause and 
to claim that the principal cause of the movement is just the cylinder itself, by virtue of its 
rollable shape.  In the same way, he argues, human action can depend on impressions and 
yet not be caused in this principal sense by anything other than the agent’s own character.  
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A similar impression occurring in someone whose character was different could produce 
a very different impulse, or no impulse at all.107 
 
The control one may have over one’s own character comes as function of his or her use 
of reason.  Because of the connection between character and reason, “Knowledge and goodness 
go hand-in-hand.”108  A person who is vigilantly rational, intelligent, and wise has maximal 
control over his soul and therefore maximal freedom. The one who does not is a slave of his 
passions - doomed to roll whichever way his impulses and environment carry him.109 
The Stoics had many ways of describing this ideal.  One way was to describe the state 
one reaches when they become perfectly rational and self-governing.  They called this state 
apathiea.  This is not to be confused with “apathy” in the modern sense, but as a mastery over 
the emotions by eliminating false beliefs or faulty reasoning.110  As one writer explains, 
The passions or pathe are literally ‘things which one undergoes’ and are to be contrasted 
with actions or things which one does.  Thus, the view that one should be ‘apathetic,’ in 
its original Hellenistic sense, is not the view that you shouldn’t care about anything, but 
rather the view that you should not be psychologically subject to anything – manipulated 
and moved by it, rather than yourself being actively and positively in command of your 
reactions and responses to things as they occur or are in prospect.  It connotes a kind of 
complete self-sufficiency.111 
 
For the Stoics, the passions (roughly synonymous with the modern concept of emotion) were 
forms of judgment.  Without judgement, there is no passion.112  A person who feels the passions 
of desire, fear, sadness, or elation is making subtle judgements about themselves and the world 
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which give rise to these feelings.  But for the Stoics, being so influenced by one’s emotions was 
believed to be a form of slavery.  True freedom could only come as the result of apatheia.113  
Another way the Stoic talked about their idealization of reason was by describing the person who 
had reached it.  When a person reaches the state of apatheia, he has become a sage or “Wise 
Man.”  Seneca describes this Stoic ideal: 
The wise man does not need to walk timidly and cautiously; for so great is his confidence 
in himself that he does not hesitate to go against Fortune, and will never retreat before 
her.  Nor has he any reason to fear her, for he counts not merely his chattels and his 
possessions and his position, but even his body and his eyes and his hands and all else 
that makes life very dear to a man, nay even himself, among the things that are given on 
sufferance, and he lives as one who has been lent to himself and will return everything 
without sorrow when it is reclaimed.  Nor is he therefore cheap in his own eyes, because 
he knows that he does not belong to himself, but he will perform all his duties as 
diligently and as circumspectly as a devout and holy man is wont to guard the property 
entrusted to his protection.  When however, he is bidden to give them up he will not 
quarrel with Fortune but will say “I give thanks for what I have possessed and held.  I 
have managed your property to great advantage, but, since you order me, I give it up, I 
surrender it gratefully and gladly.  If you still wish me to have anything of yours, I shall 
guard it; if your pleasure is otherwise, I give back and restore to you my silver, both 
wrought and coined, my house, and my household” Should nature recall what she 
previously entrusted us with, we shall say to her also: “Take back the spirit that is better 
than when you gave it.  I do not quibble or hang back; of my own free will I am ready for 
you to take what you gave me before I was conscious-away with it!114 
 
The wise man was a sort of psycho-epistemological superhero who held only true beliefs and 
therefore had perfectly healthy affectivity at all times.115 This idealized figure was a critical 
component of Stoic philosophy.  Stoics argued whether such a person had ever in fact existed, 
and whether certain historical figures might have been “Wise Men.”  Rival philosophical schools 
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lampooned the Stoics on this point.116  Nonetheless, the “Wise Man” played a normative function 
for the Stoics.  He represented the telos of Stoic cognitive therapy and was the personification of 
their theory of human flourishing.  The virtues of the hypothetical Wise Man inspired and 
clarified the way towards moral perfection.  He represented a role model to be copied – 
illustrating to those willing to pay attention what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided.  
He lived in complete agreement with Reason and with Nature at all times, as one scholar notes, 
“Stoics did, in fact, hold that emotions like fear or envy (or impassioned sexual attachments, or 
passionate love of anything whatsoever) either were, or arose from false judgements and that the 
sage – a person who had attained moral and intellectual perfection – would not undergo them.117  
Whatever emotions and passions he did feel, he was not governed by them, “Things do move 
him, but not in such a way as to disturb his balanced judgement and make him attribute an 
importance to them which they do not have.”118 
As an important caveat, not all affective moments were considered by Stoics to fall 
within the purview of reason.  Even a perfectly rational human being would be expected to 
experience very intense feelings in response to sudden, unexpected stimuli, such as threatening 
sights or sounds, or sexually provocative images.  One cannot help having bodily responses to 
these kinds of things, regardless of how wise or rational they may be.  However, Stoics, 
especially Epictetus and Seneca, did not regard these experiences as genuine emotions.  The 
stimuli, in virtue of their sudden onset and intensity, leave no opportunity for reason to pass a 
judgement, and so they are not to be counted as emotions.  Only once reason has the opportunity 
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to engage with and evaluate the stimuli and ones own psycho-physiological response to them, 
does the person experience what can be considered bona fide human emotions.119   An 
appropriate analogy could be the body’s physical reflexes.  When the doctor taps your knee with 
a hammer, your leg kicks up; it is merely your body doing the action, not you as a reasoning 
person.   
Stoic Metaphysics and Theology played an important role in their understanding of the 
virtues of the wise man as well as their techniques for self-improvement.  As noted before, the 
Stoics argued that there is an all-powerful, all-rational, cosmic, provident God in charge of the 
Universe.120 Their Theology allowed them a degree of detachment from external circumstances; 
since all things are directed by Providence towards ever greater perfection, there is nothing to be 
sad, angry, or afraid about (though that is not to say they did not care about the natural world – 
more on this below).  One’s confidence in the inherent benevolence and rationality of the Logos 
played an axiomatic role in their use of cognitive therapy, particularly when combating anxious 
emotions.121 An example of this is the famous Hymn to Zeus by the early Stoic Cleanthes:   “Nay 
thou canst make the rough smooth, bring wonderous order forth from chaos; in Thy sight 
unloveliness seems beautiful; for so Thou hast fitted things together, good and evil, that there 
reigns one everlasting Reason in them all.”122  And the following passage by Epictetus in which 
he chastises his students: 
Now that you know all this, come and appreciate the resources you have, and when that is 
done, say ‘Bring on whatever difficulties you like Zeus; I have resources and a 
constitution that you gave me by means of which I can do myself credit whatever 
happens.’  But no.  There you sit, worrying that certain events might happen already 
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upset an in a state about your present circumstances.  So then you reproach the gods.  
What else can come of such weakness except impiety?  And yet God has not merely 
given us strength to tolerate troubles without being humiliated or undone, but, as befitted 
a kind and true father, he had given them to us free from constraint, compulsion, and 
impediment.  He has put the whole matter in our control, not even reserving to himself 
any power to hinder us or stand in our way.  And even though you have these powers free 
and entirely your own, you don’t use them because you still don’t realize what you have 
or where it came from.  Instead you sit crying and complaining – some of you blind to 
your benefactor, and unable to acknowledge his existence, others assailing God with 
complaints and accusations from sheer meanness of spirit.123 
 
One author recognizes this as a stock-and-trade technique of cognitive therapy for the Stoics 
which he calls “the view from above.”  
The cardinal meditative technique of Stoic metaphysics is the “View from above,” … in 
which the philosopher becomes dispassionate by contemplating the “bigger picture,” 
expanding his perspective to encompass the whole world, or the totality of space and 
time.  It is this contemplation of cosmology and metaphysics that the Stoics used to 
induce feelings of serenity and which helps to illustrate the initially surprising link 
between Stoic “physics” and the practical conquest of irrational fears and desires.124 
 
The belief that God providentially orders all things towards the good, and that human 
beings possess a divine spark of reason played a crucial role in understanding their use of the 
cognitive therapy: “there is nothing of ultimate relevance for you that is not under your power, 
and the passions or emotions that get in the way of your exercise of that power are therefore not 
worthy of being held.”  Notwithstanding the apparent oversimplification, the Stoics understood 
that one needed training and practice to reach this ideal, “It is true that no bull reaches maturity 
in an instant, nor do men become heroes overnight.”125  The Stoics were sensitive to the fact that 
cognitive intervention was a skill which required practice to attain mastery.  True mastery, or 
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apatheia, was only held by the Sage, whose powers of wisdom, reason, and self-control were 
preternatural. 
Having covered Stoic conceptions of Theology, free will, apatheia, and the “Wise Man,” 
it is now time to discuss the concept of Natural Law within Stoicism.  The Stoic philosophy of 
Natural Law is a concept which ties together Stoic Theology, Anthropology, Ethics, and Political 
Science, weaving together their doctrines of indifferent things, the Wise Man, free will, and 
apatheia, etc.  For the Stoics, law (whether moral, legal, or scientific) was a function of the 
Logos, the Divine Reason governing the universe.  The Stoics did not perceive a hard distinction 
between fact and value that comes naturally to modern philosophers.  For them, what is (physis) 
and what ought to be (nomos) were deeply interrelated concepts.126  Since the universe is 
governed by a Rational Mind and humans possess a spark of that Rational Mind, it is possible for 
humans to observe and understand patterns in Nature, enabling them to engage in Science of all 
kinds.  As A.A. Long puts it, “The faculty in man which enables him to think, to plan, and to 
speak – which the Stoics called logos – is literally embodied in the universe at large.  The 
individual human being at the essence of his nature shared a property which belongs to Nature in 
the cosmic sense.  Cosmic events and human actions are therefore not happening of two quite 
different orders: in the last analysis they are both alike consequences of one thing – logos.”127  
Once the patterns of Nature are firmly understood by a person’s reason, they become morally 
binding, though not in a deontological way but in a teleological way.  A modern natural law 
philosopher explains this teleology with a biological metaphor, 
An acorn is not essentially something small with a point at one end and a cap at the other; 
it is something aimed at being an oak.  A boy in my neighborhood is not essentially 
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something with baggy pants and a foul mouth; he is something aimed at being a man.  In 
this way of thinking, everything in Creation is a wannabe.  We just have to recognize 
what it naturally wants to be.  Natural law turns out to be the developmental spec sheet, 
the guide for getting there.  For the acorn, nature isn’t law in the strictest sense, because 
law must be addressed to an intelligent being capable of choice.  For the boy though, it is.  
The acorn can’t be in conflict with itself.  He can.128 
 
Because there is a universal human nature and universal Reason, this “spec sheet” entails certain 
consistent principles for human flourishing as though they were divine imperatives, as Diogenes 
Laertius quotes from Chrysippus,  
Therefore, living in agreement with nature comes to be the end, which is in accordance 
with the nature of oneself and that of the whole, engaging in no activity forbidden by 
universal law, which is right reason pervading everything and identical to Zeus, who is 
the director of the administration of existing things, And the virtue of the happy man and 
his good flow of life are just this: always doing everything on the basis of concordance of 
each man’s guardian spirit with the will of the administrator of the whole.129 
 
Failure to observe these conditions will result in damage to one’s human nature as well as 
to the natural and social order as a whole.130  The damage to one’s human nature takes place 
through the loss of virtue and the eventual slavery to the passions.  For instance, Epictetus 
explains a case of someone who becomes a slave of the passion of greed, 
When once you have desired money, if there is an application of reason which will lead 
you to recognize the evil the desire stops and our directive faculty governs as at the start, 
but if you do not apply anything in the way of [cognitive] therapy, it no longer returns to 
the same condition but when it is again stimulated by the corresponding impression it is 
kindled in to desire more quickly than before.  And if this keeps happening, it thereafter 
becomes calloused, and the infirmity gives stability to greed.131 
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Only through continuous132 practice could one preserve his reason, nature, and freedom: 
Repeated episodes of desire give rise to greed, and repeated episodes of fear give rise to 
timorousness.  I suggest here that such repeated episodes exercise their influence 
specifically in their character as judgements, by altering our long-term views about 
matters of value and importance.  In this way they lead us gradually to a point where even 
the most trivial provocation seems inevitably to produce a powerful emotional response.  
However, it is also possible to reverse the process of entrenchment through the exercise 
of reason by means of self-coaching and various techniques of cognitive therapy.133 
 
In tandem with the concept of Natural Law, the Stoics recognized a gradation of 
contingent goods ranking below the single unqualified good of Virtue.  To explain how such 
contingent goods relate to the non-contingent good of Virtue, they had a concept called 
kathekonta134 or “appropriate acts.”  The kathekonta were actions that had the primary goal of 
preserving or increasing one’s virtue.  While many things were considered good or indifferent in 
themselves, actions that were not chosen for the unconditional purpose of exercising one’s 
virtues were ultimately harmful to one’s nature, their virtue, and their reason.  The kathekonta 
were those things which were indifferent to virtue per se but, all other things being equal, were 
preferable. 
In order to make the value of virtue sharply distinct from that of natural advantages like 
wealth, the Stoics confined the reference of the ordinary Greek words for ‘good’ and 
‘bad,’ advantageous and ‘disadvantageous,’ ‘useful,’ and ‘useless’ to virtue and vice 
versa respectively. [‘The good’ and ‘the profitable’ are logically equivalent…]  
Everything else is indifferent so far as moral judgements are concern.  But within the 
category of indifferent’ things, the natural advantages are marked off as ‘preferred’ or 
‘preferable’ and their opposites are similarly classified as ‘things to be rejected.135 
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It was indifferent, though preferable to be wealthy, to be healthy, clothed, and free of distress.  
But if at any point these things conflicted with Virtue, they were to be abandoned without worry 
or complaint. 
Failure to obey the dictates of reason and nature did damage not only to the individual, 
but to society.  For the Stoics health, politics, and cosmology were all interconnected.136  For 
them, whole societies, just as much as anything else in the universe, were formed according to 
Reason and violation of the Natural Law in one area could impact the proper functioning of 
another area.  To the extent that individuals and societies functioned in accordance with Nature 
and Reason they would flourish, but the more they lived at odds with Nature and Reason, the 
more they would fail. 
Like the other Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism came into being at a time when old 
localized nations were being absorbed into sprawling empires, and people with vastly differing 
customs and views of the world were expected to function alongside another as citizens of the 
same Empire.  Prior to this people were governed by local ethnic and national customs which 
helped them understand their roles and discern appropriate behaviors.  But the assimilation of 
peoples with conflicting customs and worldviews into these empires created a problem.  In a 
pluralistic society, how were disputes to be settled when the culture or customs of one people 
group in the empire, clashed with those of another?  Which customs were to be honored, and 
which ones were to be forsaken? 
Stoics aspired to be cosmopolitan, citizens of the cosmos, over and above any regional, 
tribal, or familial memberships.  This was part and parcel of their Cynic heritage.  As one scholar 
puts it, “The Cynics were natural opponents of those who held pleasure to be the end of life.  In 
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their deprecation of the civic community and of civic virtue, the Cynics were the proponents of 
the idea of the natural equality of all men and of the membership of all men in one single 
society.”137They argued that all men were created equal because they shared the same divine 
spark and the potential for rational thought.  This sharing of divinity entailed a common bond of 
all men and women138 (and even in some cases of animals139) that runs deeper than any 
distinctions of culture, nationality or ethnicity.140  As such, Natural Law superseded all local and 
particular customs, and was the criterion by which civil laws were judged; civil laws not in 
accord with the cosmic Natural Law were de facto not laws, but aberrations from law.  Philo of 
Alexandria, a Greek-speaking Jew, identified the Natural Law with the Torah: “Philo creates a 
new story that magnifies the Greek Jewish scriptures as the vehicle through which ‘each nation 
would abandon its peculiar ways, and, throwing overboard their ancestral customs, turn to 
honoring our laws alone.”141  Their deviance from Nature meant they were to be avoided and 
corrected.  Failure to obey the Natural Law within a society could lead to that society to devolve 
into base irrationality, overdependence on contingent things, and slavery to the passions.  
Disobedience of the Natural Law contained its own punishments.  As Cicero says, 
[Natural Law] Summons to duty by its commands and averts from wrongdoing by its 
prohibitions.  And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, 
though neither have any effect on the wicked.  It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it 
allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely.  We 
cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people and we need not look outside 
ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it.  And there will not be different laws at 
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Rome and at Athens or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and 
unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master 
and ruler that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its 
enforcing judge.  Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human 
nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he 
escapes what is commonly considered punishment.142 
 
 But the Stoics did not believe that everything that happened “in nature” was 
automatically “natural,” otherwise Natural Law would lose any normative force, merely 
describing things that happen, rather than prescribing how they ought to happen.  It was an 
axiom for the Stoics that what was natural was inherently patterned, consistent, harmonious, 
healthy, and good.  For instance, we commonly think of diseases as natural events, but such an 
idea would have sounded strange to the Stoics, for they were signs of disruption and chaos, the 
exact opposite of the harmonious patterns built into the Universe by the Logos.  There appears to 
have been some awareness of the problem of theodicy among the Stoics.  One possible 
explanation offered for the existence of disorder is that human free will allowed people to 
disobey the patterns of nature, creating room for events in the Universe that appeared natural, 
but really aren’t, as Margaret Graver points out, quoting Diogenes Laertius, “The rational animal 
is corrupted sometimes by the persuasiveness of things from without, sometimes through the 
teaching of our associates.  For the starting points which nature provides are uncorrupted.”143  
But ultimately the Stoics, in contrast with Christianity and Judaism, did not seem to feel pressed 
to explain these problems, and simply accepted them as tragic yet inevitable consequences of 
Fortune.144  And these were not to be complained of, but taken as opportunities to develop heroic 
virtues, “A man of his mettle is not one to accuse God, who chose him, of unfairness in making 
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him ill.  He positively prides himself on his hardships and is bold enough to be a roadside 
attraction.  What would be blame God for?  That he cuts such an admirable figure?  What would 
the charge be?  That his virtue is too glaringly bright?”145 
 Looking back on CBT, we saw how it was inspired by Stoic philosophy, and adopted the 
Stoic view of behavioral and emotional regulation through cognitive change.  But in Stoic 
Philosophy, the idea of cognitive therapy was inseparable from their theology, their metaphysics, 
and their views of Natural Law.  CBT, on the other hand, does not include any normative theory 
of human flourishing, but rather relies on the individual client and therapist to decide for 
themselves what does or does not constitute “mental health.”  To illustrate the difference, 
consider how Epictetus counseled a man caught in adultery, and how this episode differs from 
the case of the CBT counselor and the cheating woman presented in chapter one. 
Epictetus was saying that, as human beings, we are born to be faithful to one another and 
that whoever denies this denies their humanity.  Just then, a well-known scholar entered 
the room – one who had been caught in adultery while in Rome.  So Epictetus continues, 
‘But what are we really doing when we throw away our innate faithfulness, to intrigue 
with our neighbor’s wife?  We are ruining and destroying – well, what?  How about the 
man of trust, principle and piety that once was?  And is that all?  Aren’t we also ruining 
the idea of neighbourliness, friendship and community?  What position are we putting 
ourselves in?  How am I supposed to deal with you now?  As a neighbor?  A friend?  
Some friend!  A fellow citizen?  But how can a fellow citizen like you be trusted?146 
 
For Epictetus, human virtues are objective and have their basis in human nature.  This very fact 
is what makes them useful guides to ethical conduct and human flourishing.  The flourishing of 
the individual and the flourishing of society are inseparable, for both are based in human nature, 
and the same virtues will lead to happiness and health for both. 
Conclusion  
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This chapter summarized some of the history and belief of Stoicism as it pertains to the 
ideas of cognitive therapy.  It has shown how their psychotherapeutic practices were mediated by 
their normative, metaphysical, and theological views of Nature.  Their teachings about regulation 
of the passions by Reason were regulated by the idea of the cosmic Logos and Natural Law.  
Next we discuss how Christians modified these ideas and incorporated them into their 
Christological and Theistic worldview.  Following this, I will present how the Christian 
appropriations of these ideas compares and contrasts with the modern psychological 















Chapter 3: Christianity 
 Chapter one examined the history of CBT and how it was inspired by Stoic philosophy.  I 
showed that CBT, though inspired by Stoicism, is not grounded in any conception of morality or 
human flourishing. Chapter two examined Stoicism, and how the Stoic philosophy and practice 
which inspired CBT was morally grounded in Natural Law and an ethics of virtue.  In this 
chapter we will examine how early Christian ascetics was also inspired by Stoic concepts of 
cognitive, but unlike CBT, retained its grounding in normative concepts of morality and human 
flourishing. 
Christianity was in many ways a product of Graeco-Roman culture.  Despite its Jewish 
heritage, it readily appropriated concepts and arguments of pagan philosophers to clarify its 
beliefs and positions to the point that it is nearly as Hellenic as it is Jewish.  The influence of 
Neo-Platonism on early Christianity has been extensively studied,147 but it would be difficult to 
overstate the importance of Stoicism.148  In the first century after Christ, Stoicism was likely the 
most popular philosophy in the Roman Empire.149  Stoic notions of cognitive therapy, Logos, 
Natural Law, and the Wise Man all appear in the New Testament and authoritative post-biblical 
patristic documents.  These ideas, with slight modifications, continued to play a normative role 
in Christianity.  But the history of Stoic influence on Christianity goes deeper still, beginning 
before the birth of Christ, during the Greek occupation of Israel. 
Hellenism in the Old Testament 
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 After the destruction of the first temple in Jerusalem in 597 B.C. Israel and Judah fell 
victim to a series of invasions, occupations, and exiles by foreign nations:  Babylon, Persia, the 
Ptolemies, the Seleucid Kingdom, Greece, and finally Rome.150  While it was long a concern for 
Israelite prophets that Judaism would be contaminated by influence from foreign nations, 
elements of Greek culture, thought, and language trickled into the Jewish religion (the words 
Synagogue and Pentateuch are both Greek).  The Torah and other important Jewish religious 
texts were translated into Greek, forming what has become known as the Septuagint.  For the 
growing population of diaspora Jews who did not know Hebrew, this translation provided their 
only means of reading their scriptures.  Despite the translation, many Jews believed the 
Septuagint retained the authority of the original Hebrew texts. It continues to provide some of the 
earliest and most authoritative versions of portions of Old Testament even today.151 
Two Old Testament books were composed during this time: The Wisdom of Solomon 
and Sirach.  Each of these books shows evidence of influence from Stoic ideas.  The Wisdom of 
Solomon book is believed to have been composed within one century before or after the birth of 
Christ.152  In the first chapter of this book, emphasis is placed the love of wisdom and the 
discipline of one’s thoughts, two very characteristically Stoic ideas: 
For perverse thoughts separate people from God, and when his power is tested, it exposes 
the foolish; because Wisdom will not enter a deceitful soul, or dwell in a body enslaved 
to sin.  For a holy and disciplined spirit will flee from deceit, and will leave foolish 
thoughts behind, and will be ashamed at the approach of unrighteousness… (Wisdom of 
Solomon 1:3-5)153 
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By comparison, older books of the Torah pay far less attention to categories of wisdom and 
cognition, focusing more on themes of sin, righteousness, and the will of God.  Compare the 
verse from the Wisdom of Solomon, “The ungodly will be punished as their reasoning 
deserves,” (Wisdom of Solomon 3:10) with the Ten Commandments: 
“I am the Lord your God…You shall have no other gods before me…You shall not make 
for yourself an idol…You shall not make wrongful use of the name of the Lord your 
God…Remember the Sabbath Day…Honor Your father and your mother.  You shall not 
murder.  You shall not commit adultery.  You shall not steal.  You shall not bear false 
witness.  You Shall not covet. (Exodus 20:2-17) 
 
 
In the one case, morality arises from within the person, through the acts of reason and discipline, 
while in the other, morality descends from above the person, from God’s will, outlining a basic 
difference between Stoic and Jewish ideas of morality, yet both are in scripture. 
In addition, the author references the four Greek cardinal virtues, “If anyone loves 
righteousness, her labors are virtues, for she teaches self-control [temperance], and prudence, 
justice and courage [Fortitude]; nothing in life is more profitable for mortals than these” 
(Wisdom of Solomon 8:7).  This bears resemblance to Cynic and Stoic beliefs about virtue  
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 Another Greek-influenced text in the Old Testament is the book of Sirach.  This text, is 
dated to approximately 180 B.C.154  Like Stoicism and CBT, the author emphasizes the 
importance of disciplining one’s inner thoughts as a means of moral growth: “Think of his wrath 
on the day of death, and of the moment of vengeance when he turns away His face.  In the time 
of plenty think of the time of hunger; in the days of wealth think of poverty and need” (Sirach 
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18:24).  The text draws a connection between the idea of cognitive self-control, fulfillment of 
God’s law (“Whoever keeps the law controls his thoughts, and the fulfillment of the fear of the 
Lord is wisdom.” [Sirach 21:11]), and the avoidance of sin (“Who will set whips over my 
thoughts, and the discipline of wisdom over my mind, so as not to spare me in my errors and not 
overlook my sins?” [Sirach 23:2]).  The Hellenization of Judaism provided an occasion for 
increased attention to the cognitive side of religion for Greek Jews.  This set the stage for an 
even greater integration of Stoic ideas into the new Christian religion that came into being soon 
after. 
Stoicism in the Gospels 
 The early Christians had a complex and sometimes ambivalent relationship with Greek 
though.  They found themselves divided between their Jewish heritage and the Pagan 
philosophies of the day.  Originating in the heyday of the Roman Empire, the early Christians – 
especially its gentile converts – would have been more familiar with Graeco-Roman thought than 
with the Torah or the Prophets.155  While Jesus, the Apostles, and many first generation 
Christians followers identified with Judaism, often in opposition to Graeco-Roman philosophy 
and religion, many important Christians showed no hesitation to assimilate Hellenistic and Stoic 
thought into their religious teachings.  We see evidence of this in the teaching of Christ Himself.  
One of the most unique aspects of Christ’s teaching that stood in contrast to the Judaism that 
preceded him was the special emphasis He placed on the interior mental life.  In the Sermon on 
the Mount, Jesus reinterprets the moral commandments of the Torah in cognitive terms of 
thought and emotion. 
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You have heard that it was said to those of ancient times, ‘You shall not murder’” and 
‘whoever murders shall be liable to judgement.’  But I say to you that if you are angry 
with a brother or a sister, you will be liable to judgement…  So when you are offering 
your gift at the altar, if you remember that your brother or sister has something against 
you, leave your gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled to your brother or 
sister, and then come and offer your gift. (Matthew 5:21-24) 
 
Prior to Christ, one only needed to refrain from abusing a neighbor, but what Christ requires goes 
even deeper: a resolution to abandon any interior resentments or hostilities we might feel towards 
a neighbor.  Christ repeats this cognitive shift in his teaching on adultery – proscribing not only 
the behavior, but the mental state that precedes it: “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall 
not commit adultery.’  But I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already 
committed adultery with her in his heart” (Matthew 5:27-28). 
In addition to weeding out sinful cognitions, Christ requires His follower to positively 
cultivate spiritual cognitive dispositions (such as faith and trust in Him) in order to obtain 
salvation.  This occurs most frequently in John’s Gospel: 
For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in 
him may not perish but may have eternal life.  Indeed, God did not send the Son into the 
world to condemn the world, but in order that the world might be saved through him.  
Those who believe in him are not condemned; but those who do not believe are 
condemned already, because they have not believed in the name of the only Son of God. 
(John 3:16-18) 
Jesus said to her, ‘I am the resurrection and the life. Those who believe in me, even 
though they die, will live, and everyone who lives and believes in me will never die.  Do 
you believe this? (John 10:25-26) 
I am the way, and the truth, and the life.  No one comes to the Father except through me.  
If you know me, you will know my Father also.  From now on you do know him and 
have seen him. (John 14:6-7) 
 
While the Stoics expelled anxieties and anger using arguments predicated on Divine Providence, 
here Christ takes this role unto Himself.  Accordingly, it is not merely trust in the abstract idea of 
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Divine Providence, but trust in the specific person of Jesus Christ that enables people to attain 
perfection.  Such a claim would have sounded blasphemous to Jews and bizarre to Stoics. 
Likewise, the opening of John’s Gospel begins with a profound re-interpretation of the 
Stoic doctrine of the Logos. 
In the beginning was the Logos and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God.  He 
was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him, and without him was 
not anything made that was made…  And the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us; 
we have beheld his glory, glory as the only-begotten Son from the Father. (John 1:1-
14)156 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, for the Stoics the Logos was the cosmic principle of Reason 
embedded into the universe which gave it structure and order: the laws of physics, math, 
chemistry, biology, and morality.  For John the Logos is Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, 
the messiah, come to save humanity from sin, co-existing with God at the beginning of time and 
assisting God with the creation of the universe.  For John, Christ is the Logos incarnate.  We see 
in John’s Gospel a willingness for Christians to use Stoic ideas to help explain Christian ones, 
but also the Christian ability to creatively alter those doctrines to better express the beliefs and 
dogmas of the new religion.  This influence continues into other new Testament texts, most 
especially the letters of Paul. 
Saint Paul 
The importance of Saint Paul for the early church and for Christianity as a whole can 
hardly be overstated.  This apostle, fluent in both Hebrew and Greek language and thought, 
shows a startling capacity and willingness to use the pagan philosophers for Christian purposes.  
As Abraham Malherbe notes, 
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There can no longer be any doubt that Paul was thoroughly familiar with the teaching, 
methods of operation, and style or argumentation of the philosophers of the period, all of 
which he adopted and adapted to his own purposes…  The philosophers with whom Paul 
should be compared… were preachers and teachers who say their main goal to be the 
reformation of the lives of people they encountered in a variety of contexts, ranging from 
the imperial court and the salons of the rich to the street corners.157 
 
There is a long history of exegesis that perceives Stoic ideas in the apostle’s writings, and  
some Pauline scholars have even gone so far as to describe Paul as a “crypto-stoic.”158  There is 
good reason for this.  Many of the most famous Stoic philosophers - Musonius Rufus, Seneca, 
and Epictetus – were near contemporaries of Paul and Paul was highly educated; his home town 
of Tarsus was the site of an important school of Stoic philosophy.159  In addition Paul used many 
characteristically Stoic rhetorical devices in his writing, such as the Diatribe160, and 
Paraenesis.161  The connection between Paul and Stoicism was so strong that at one point an 
exchange of letters purporting to be between Paul and Seneca, the Stoic philosopher, was 
published sometime in the first two centuries A.D.  These letters were circulated widely enough 
that their texts survive today.162  Though they are now known to be apocryphal a close 
examination of Paul’s actual writings shows his willingness to employ Stoic ideas in the service 
of Christianity.  We shall present four such Stoic ideas in Paul: the idea of cognitive control of 
the passions, the doctrine of indifferent things, Natural Law, and cosmopolitanism. 
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Like the Stoics, Paul teaches that the importance of mastering the passions is essential for 
moral conduct, he writes “Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal bodies, to make you obey 
their passions” (Romans 6:12).  But Paul sees the process of self-mastery as not only cognitive 
but supernatural, “For though we live in the world, we are not carrying on a worldly war, for the 
weapons of our warfare are not worldly but have divine power to destroy strongholds.  We 
destroy arguments and every proud obstacle to the knowledge of God, and take every thought 
captive to obey Christ” (2 Corinthians 10:5).  While the Stoics see healthy cognition epitomized 
by a harmonious relation between the individual and Nature, Paul emphasizes a doctrine of 
cognitive sanctification that sets the Christian apart from the world, bringing him closer to God: 
“Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of your mind that you 
may prove what is the will of God what is good and acceptable and perfect” (Romans 12:2-3). 
This seems to represent a synthesis for Paul between Stoic ethics and Platonic 
metaphysics.163  While the Stoics believed that all things were material, including God, the 
Platonists argued that the material world was a mere shadow of the perfect, immaterial, eternal 
and unchanging Forms.164  For the Platonists, Forms were more real, more pure, and more 
perfect than any material substance; for matter is subject to change and decay, but abstract Form 
was eternal and unchanging – my ten fingers are material and subject to change and decay, but 
the number itself is immune to change or decay.  For this reason, the Platonists saw opposition 
between material existence which tends towards corruption, and immaterial Forms.165  But for 
Paul, cognitive obedience to the Law allows the sinful, mortal, fleshly man to transcend his 
mortality and enter into union with the Divine, for “to set the mind on the flesh is death, but to 
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set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace.  For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God; 
it does not submit to God’s law, indeed it cannot; and those who are in the flesh cannot please 
God” (Rom 8:6-8).  The mind, though cognitive exercise, bridges this gap between corruptible 
material existence and the incorruptible transcendent Spirit. 
 Paul uses the Stoic doctrine of indifferent things to explain the proper Christian attitude 
towards meat sacrificed to idols.  He argues that meat sacrificed to idols is not good or bad per se 
but become good or bad depending upon how the person thinks about it: “I know and am 
persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean in itself; but it is unclean for anyone who 
thinks it unclean” (Rom 14:14).  This resembles the oft-repeated quote from Epictetus that 
inspired Albert Ellis in his invention of Rational Therapy, “Men are disturbed not by things, but 
by the views which they take of them.”166  This doctrine allows Paul to address certain knotty 
problems faced by the early Church.  Sacrifice to pagan idols was widespread at the time, but 
eating meat involved in such sacrifices was considered complicity in idol worship.  If a Christian 
ate this meat in public, it could scandalize other Christians or embolden pagans.  But it was not 
always easy to tell which meat had come from a pagan ritual sacrifice and which had not.  The 
doctrine of indifferent things helps Paul explain how it can be acceptable to eat the meat offered 
in such sacrifices in some cases, and yet harmful in others: the meat itself was indifferent – it 
was the conscience that mattered – the mind and its cognitions held priority over the behavior 
per se.  If one could eat without bringing harm to the conscience of another, then nothing was 
unclean in and of itself, but if it would lead to scandal, doubt, or confusion for a brother or a 
neighbor, it was a sin. 
                                                          




Natural Law also appears in Paul’s thought, though historical circumstances complicate 
any attempt at an analysis of Paul’s views on this topic.  He was simultaneously a Pharisaical 
Jew, a Roman citizen, a Philosopher, and a Christian – words for “Law” could have had different 
meanings when considered under each of these aspects of Paul’s personality.  To Paul the 
Pharisee, “Law” meant the covenant between God and Moses.  To Paul the Roman citizen, 
“Law” meant the civil laws of Roman Empire.  To Paul the philosopher, law meant the Logos. 
And for Paul the Christian, the Law meant the curse laid upon humankind by God in order to 
show him his own sinfulness and his need for salvation, to prepare him to receive salvation from 
the messiah, Jesus Christ.167  Notwithstanding these complications, there are some unambiguous 
appearances of Natural Law in Paul’s thought.  One of most striking passages in all of Paul’s 
writings comes in the first chapter of his letter to the Romans.  Paul writes: 
When the Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a 
law to themselves, even though they do not have the law.  They show that what the law 
requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness and their 
conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them on that day when, according to my 
gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus. (Rom 2:14-16) 
 
Paul here contrasts the Jews who have “have the law,” (i.e., the covenant law of Moses) with the 
non-Jewish gentiles who “have not the law.”  The law was the pride of the Jewish people, for it 
showed that God had chosen the Jewish people to be the special recipients of His self-revelation 
– and to be his Chosen People.  It distinguished Israel from all other nations.  As a Christian Paul 
is saying the law prepares the way for Christ to “judge the secrets of men,” but as a Philosopher, 
Paul is saying that the law of God is “written on the heart” of all human beings, Jew or not.  This 
internal law “bears witness to their conflicting thoughts,” showing them right from wrong and 
good from evil regardless of their customs and heritage and without the aid of explicit divine 
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revelation.  As we have seen in chapter two, Stoic Natural Law was a cosmic moral code that 
superseded ethnic, political, and religious custom.  By connecting the idea of Natural Law with 
moral conscience, Paul reinforces the connections between morality and cognition, which in turn 
helps him explain how even pagans can know right from wrong as a result of their God-given 
human nature.168 
 But further develops the idea of Natural Law.  He attaches to it important Christian 
concepts of God’s Wrath, and condemnation of idolatry, 
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of 
men who by their wickedness suppress the truth.  For what can be known about God is 
plain to them, because God has shown it to them…  For although they knew God, they 
did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking 
and their senseless minds were darkened.  Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and 
exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling moral man or birds or 
animals or reptiles.  Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, 
to the dishonoring of their bodies among themselves because they exchanged the truth 
about God for a lie and worshipped and served the creature rather than the creator…  
Their women exchanged natural relations for unnatural, and the men likewise gave up 
natural relations with women and were consumed with passion for one another, men 
committing shameless acts with men and receiving in their own persons the due penalty 
for their error. (Rom 1:18-27) 
 
While the law is “written on the heart” of all people, that does not automatically mean that all 
human practices accord with this law, as people are capable of “exchanging the truth for a lie” 
and turning their back on the Natural Law.  For the Stoics, the punishment of transgressing the 
Natural Law is contained in the vices resulting from the transgression – e.g.ignorance, 
irrationality, and slavery to the passions.  Paul strikes a similar chord169 when he writes for “they 
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became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened … consumed with 
passion.”  For Paul, God’s wrath against the disobedient consists in God “giving up” the 
disobedient to “dishonorable passions.” (Rom 1:26).  The final and critically Christian theme 
with which Paul concludes this otherwise largely Stoic passage, is the need for humility and 
repentance: 
Therefore you have no excuse, O man, whoever you are, when you judge another; for in 
passing judgement upon him, you condemn yourself, because you, the judge, are doing 
the very same things.  We know that the judgement of God rightly falls upon those who 
do such things.  Do you suppose, O man, that when you judge those who do such things 
and you do them yourself, you will escape the judgement of God?  Or do you presume 
upon the riches of his kindness and forbearance and patience?  Do you not know that 
God’s kindness is meant to lead you to repentance? (Rom 2:1-4) 
 
Far from being a cause for pride, the Law magnifies how everyone falls short and indicates their 
need for a Savior. 
 Lastly, there is Paul’s cosmopolitanism.  For Paul, the law of God is written on to the 
heart of all human beings, undermining any ground for arrogance on the part of the Jewish 
people and granting opportunity to know and follow God to all people regardless of their birth.  
But Paul conceives of an even deeper brotherhood of mankind through baptism into Christ, “For 
as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ.  There is neither Jew nor Greek, 
there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female;170 for you are all one in Christ 
Jesus.  And if you are Christ’s, then you are Abraham’s offspring, heirs according to promise” 
(Galatians 3:27-29).  So while Paul appears to have embraced Stoic cosmopolitanism, he 
anticipates the even greater bond that will be shared by all people through baptism into Christ.   
                                                          
170 Wayne A Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003), 23. 
61 
 
 In sum, Paul embraced a considerable number of Stoic ideas and readily employed them 
in the service of understanding Christianity, and teaching the first generation of Christian moral 
behavior.  Paul embraces Stoic ideas without firm commitments to them.  He uses them, builds 
upon them, and sometimes contradicts them, showing that ultimately his commitments lie 
elsewhere.  Perhaps Paul’s most significant Christian contribution to the largely Stoic foundation 
of his ethical system is this: for Paul the moral life is exemplified by virtues that transcend the 
traditional virtues recognized by the Stoics.  For Paul the ultimate virtue is Love: 
If I speak in the tongues of mortals and of angels, but do not have love I am a noisy gong 
or a clanging cymbal.  And if I have prophetic powers, and understand all mysteries and 
all knowledge, and if I have faith, so as to remove mountains, but do not have love, I am 
nothing.  If I give away all my possessions, and if I hand over my body so that I may 
boast, but do not have love, I gain nothing…” (1 Cor 13:1-3) 
 
For the Stoic, the ideal was Wisdom, and the model was the “Wise Man” or Sage.  For the 
Christian, the ideal is Love, and the model is Christ.  This development is mirrored by other early 
Christian writers including St. Peter,171 and St. Clement.172 
While Paul appears to have known and been profoundly influenced by the Stoic 
doctrines, it seems that Paul was willing to depart from them for something better.  If Paul had 
been trained as a Stoic, this departure from Stoic doctrine would likely have been endorsed by at 
least one famous Stoic, Marcus Aurelius: 
If you discover in the life of man something higher than justice, truth, temperance, 
fortitude, and generally speaking than your understanding contented with itself, where it 
presents you behaving by the rule of right, and satisfied with destiny, in what is assigned 
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to you and is not yours to choose; if, I say, you see something higher than this, turn to it 
with all your heart and enjoy the supreme good now that it is found.173 
 
In summary, there is significant evidence that St. Paul was influenced by Stoicism.  He 
taught ideas very similar to Stoic cognitive therapy, and likewise held apparently Stoic moral 
ideas – a doctrine of indifferent things, a doctrine of Natural Law, and cosmopolitan inclinations 
– which, while not grounding any practices of cognitive therapy explicitly, provided a moral 
context within which a Christian cognitive therapy could be framed.  It would take future 
thinkers to develop Christian cognitive therapy into an actual organized practice.  This is where 
the great Christian ascetics come into play. 
Patristic Era Ascetics: Anthony, Evagrius, Climacus 
Signs of a full-blown theory and practice of Christian cognitive therapy first appear 
during the patristic era, at a time when Stoicism became even more popular among great 
Christian thinkers.  The greatest theologian of his day, Origen (d. 253), regarded Epictetus as the 
most influential philosopher in the world, outstripping even Plato.174  Tertullian (d. 220), another 
great theologian, claims Seneca as a Christian thinker, referring to him once as “frequently our 
own,” and another time as simply “our own Seneca.”175  Christian martyrs relied on the 
principles of Stoicism to accept their trials, difficulties and persecutions without losing faith, Just 
as the same principles helped the pagans accept the vicissitudes of Fortune with apatheia.176  
Christian ascetics saw Stoicism’s usefulness, and adopted the ideas of cognitive therapy into 
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their worldview, teaching their communities how to control their passions in ways that resemble 
modern cognitive-behavioral therapies.  Fr. Alexis Trader points out many similarities between 
the two. 
Both affirm the centrality of the thought-life or meaning-making structures of cognition 
in psychological functioning.  Both view unhealthy thoughts about the self, the 
environment, and the future as a source for psychological problems.  Both recognize that 
the correction of the thoughts or the purification of the thoughts is the use of reason as 
instrumental in better human functioning.  Both assert that a human being is able to exert 
‘personal control over thoughts and behaviors that promote change in a healthy 
direction’177 
 
The patristic and ascetic literature that deals with topics of cognitive therapy is vast.178 
We shall limit our discussion to three texts: The Life of St. Anthony, Evagrius Ponticus’s The 
Praktikos, and John Climacus’s The Ladder of Divine Ascent.  We shall show how the Christian 
Ascetics had developed a detailed theory and vibrant practice of cognitive therapy.  This therapy 
shared the basic principles and insights of the Stoics and modern CBT discussed in chapters one 
and two.  We shall also discuss what distinguishes the Christian cognitive therapy from CBT and 
Stoicism.  In short what they all have in common is the notion is the basic idea that behaviors 
and emotions stem from internal mental states and ways of thinking, and that thoughts can be 
examined and changed using reason to control our emotions and behaviors; what distinguishes 
the Christian practice from CBT is that it is morally grounded in idealized conceptions of virtue 
which give it moral norms.  What distinguishes it from Stoicism is that classical virtues, such as 
apatheia, are subordinated to distinctly Christian virtues of Faith, Hope, and Love, and its 
commitment to giving external, supernatural agents a role in the cognitive process. 
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Anthony – Thoughts and Demons 
 We must begin our discussion by noting the role that supernatural agents played in 
Christian cognitive therapy.  In the patristic era, demonology developed parallel to and in tandem 
with Christian versions of cognitivism.  Exorcism and the rebuke of demons was central to the 
ministry of Jesus and the apostles throughout the New Testament, and the entire milieu of 
patristic era asceticism is rife with stories and theories about angels and demons.  Further 
examination of patristic ascetic texts will likely be unintelligible to a modern reader who does 
not first understand this point.  As Father Trader writes, 
…the fathers classify thoughts as angelic, demonic, and human.  Some cognitive 
psychologists might be prone to reject this classification as a pernicious vestige of 
medieval superstition.  For an Orthodox Christian, however, the presence of angelic and 
demonic forces is a non-negotiable component of Christian belief according to the 
testimony of Scripture and Sacred Tradition.179 
 
There is perhaps no better way to begin than through examination of the Life of St. 
Anthony.  St. Anthony (ca 251 – 356) was the perhaps the earliest and greatest ascetics of the 
Patristic era.  Like many who came after him, Anthony wanted to avoid the dangers that worldly 
comfort posed to his relationship with Christ.  He left his home, family, city, and possessions and 
fled to the desert in search of a life that would imitate his Lord.  Though his life is legendary, he 
was not a mythical figure.  We know much about the man, thanks to his biography, The Life of 
St. Anthony, written by the Egyptian theologian St. Athanasius who personally met and collected 
stories about Anthony.180 
Anthony lived in constant prayer, alone in a desert cave in Egypt.  Demons, offended by 
his holiness, tempted and tormented him.  According to the stories preserved by Athanasius, the 
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battles between Anthony and his demons were waged with cognitive weapons on both sides.  
The demons would propose distressing or tempting thoughts to Anthony, and Anthony would 
resist and fight back with cognitive rebukes of his own, as we read “the more the Evil one 
brought unto him filthy and maddening thoughts, the more Saint Anthony took refuge in prayer 
and in abundant supplication, and amid them [all] he remained wholly chaste…”181They attacked 
not only his thoughts, but emotions as well, 
At the beginning of his tempting of the saint, he approached him with flattery, and cast 
into him anxiety as to his possessions, and solicitude and love for his sister, and for his 
family, and for his kinsfolk, and the love of money and lusts of various kinds, and the 
thought of the rest of the things of the life of this world, and finally of the hard and 
laborious life which he lived, and of the weakness of body which would come upon him 
with the lapse of time; and, in short, he stirred up in him the power of the thoughts so that 
by means of one or other of them he might be flattered, and might be made to possess 
shortcomings and be caught in the net through his instigation.182 
 
Anthony heroically rebuked them with reason and prayer, fighting back with arguments given to 
him by God. 
And again the Enemy multiplied in him the thoughts of lust, until Saint Anthony became 
as one who was being burned up, not through the Evil One, but through his own lusts; but 
he girded himself about with the threat of the thought of the Judgement, and of the torture 
of Gehenna, and of the worm which dieth not.  And whist meditating, on the thoughts 
which could be directed against the Evil One, he prayed for thoughts which would be 
hostile to him.183 
 
In this milieu, demonology and Cognitivism develop side-by side to the point where they 
become virtually indistinguishable.  This pattern is virtually ubiquitous in the writings of the 
ascetics, and any examination of the therapy they developed must take this into account.  With 
this topic out of the way, we can turn to the first systematic method of Christian cognitive 
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therapy based on the categorization and ranking of demonic and sinful thoughts and the methods 
for overcoming them.  For this we turn to The Praktikos of EvagriusPonticus. 
EvagriusPonticus – The Logoismoi 
Evagrius Ponticus (d. 399 A.D.) was another Christian who, like Anthony, fled to the 
desert to save his soul and become holy.  He was Greek, a bishop’s son, and a friend of the 
Cappadocian fathers St. Basil and St. Gregory Nazianzen.  He experienced dream visions that 
told him he must flee from city life to the Egyptian desert to avoid damnation.184  He fled to 
Egypt and joined a monastic community, practicing strict asceticism and studying the writings of 
Origen, the great Alexandrian theologian.  Evagrius wrote many texts on theology, prayer, and 
Christian spirituality.  One of his most influential works, The Praktikos, introduces a full-blown 
Christian nosology of psycho-spiritual problems: the Eight Logoismoi.  The eight Logoismoi, or 
passionate thoughts, was a list of thoughts that were believed to be the ultimate cause of all sins.  
It was later revised to become the more familiar Seven Deadly Sins.185  It was the contemporary 
equivalent of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM, currently in its 5th edition) used by 
mental health professionals today.186  Just as the passions represented errors in judgement, 
emotion, and behavior for the Stoics, the logoismoi represented specific kinds of thoughts that 
led to sin: gluttony, impurity, avarice, sadness, anger, acedia, vainglory, and pride.  Each of the 
logoismoi represents not only the passion per se but also the kind of demon which provokes that 
passion.  Unlike the earlier Christian accounts of demonic activity which were merely 
descriptive, such as those in The Life of St. Anthony, Evagrius attempts to classify these attacks 
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into a coherent nosological/etiological system: some logoismoi are more dangerous than others 
or are dangerous in unique ways, for example, “The most fierce passion is anger…  It constantly 
irritates the soul and above all at the time of prayer it seizes the mind and flashes the picture of 
the offensive person before one’s eyes.”187  Some tend to co-occur or reinforce each other.  For 
example, 
The spirit of vainglory is most subtle and it readily grows up in the souls of those who 
practice virtue.  It leads them to desire to make their struggles known publicly, to hunt 
after the praise of men.  This in turn leads to their illusory healings of women, or to their 
hearing fancied sounds as the cries of demons – crows of people who touch their 
clothes…  When in this way he is carried aloft by vain hope, the demon vanishes and the 
monk is left to be tempted by the demon of pride or of sadness who brings upon him 
thoughts opposed to his hopes…  It also happens at times that a man who a short while 
before was a holy priest, is led off bound and is handed over to the demon of impurity to 
be sifted by him.188 
 
Some tend to preclude or rule-out others. For example, 
The demon of acedia… causes the most serious trouble of all…  First of all he makes it 
seem that the sun barely moves, if at all, and that the day is fifty hours long…  Then too 
he instills in the heart of the monk a hatred for the place, a hatred for his very life itself, a 
hatred for manual labor…  No other demon follows close upon the heels of this one 
(when he is defeated) but only a state of deep peace and inexpressible joy arise out of this 
struggle.189 
 
Like any good nosology, the Eight Logoismoi function as a guide for “treatment.”  The 
treatments Evagrius proposes for overcoming the logoismoi bear much in common with the  
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techniques proposed by Seneca, 
Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius, but 
with a distinctly Christian flavor.  
For example he suggests cognitive techniques for overcoming acedia, 
When we meet with the demon of acedia then is the time … to divide our soul in two.  
One part is to encourage; the other is to be encouraged.  Thus we are to sow the seeds of 
a firm hope in ourselves while we sing with the holy David” Why are you filled with 
sadness, my soul?  Why are you distraught?  Trust in God, for I shall give praise to him.  
He it is who saves me, the light of my eyes and my God.190 
 
And like CBT, he integrates behavioral techniques alongside the cognitive,191 such as in regard 
to anger, (“A gift snuffs out the fire of resentment”)192 and gluttony (“When the soul desires to 
seek after a variety of foods then it is time to afflict it with bread and water that is may learn to 
be grateful for a mere morsel of bread.  For satiety desires a variety of dishes but hunger thinks 
itself happy to get its fill of nothing more than bread.”)193  But Christian cognitive therapy did 
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not proceed through a simplistic correspondence of problem with technique.194  Careful 
discernment and wisdom were always necessary, 
Reading, vigils and prayer – these are the things that lend stability to the wandering mind.  
Hunger toil and solitude are the means of extinguishing the flames of desire.  Turbid 
anger is calmed by the singing of Psalms, by patience and almsgiving.  But all these 
practices are to be engaged in according to due measure and at the appropriate times.  
What is untimely done, or done without measure, endures but a short time.  And what is 
short-lived is more harmful than profitable.195 
 
One such discernment is to distinguish between demonic and non-demonic thoughts, 
The passions of the soul are occasioned by men.  Those of the body come from the body.  
How the passions of the body are cut off by continence and those of the soul by spiritual 
love…  The demons that rule over the passions of the soul persevere until death.  Those 
which rule over the bodily passions depart more quickly.  The other demons are like the 
rising or setting sun in that they are found in only a part of the soul. [Acedia] however, is 
accustomed to embrace the entire soul and oppress the spirit.  It is therefore after the 
extinction of the passions that the solitary life is sweet, for then the memories are only 
simple...196 
  
 Now that we have discussed supernatural agents, we may move on to the second 
distinctive characteristic of Christian cognitive therapy: the integration of virtue ethics.  While 
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Evagrius does not present a list of virtues equal and opposite to the eight logoismoi, he clearly 
sees virtues as playing a necessary role in one’s spiritual progress, as he writes, “A man who has 
established the virtues in himself and is entirely permeated with them no longer remembers the 
law or commandments or punishment.  Rather, he says and does what excellent habit 
suggests.”197  Virtues such as temperance, humility and apatheia are given roles: “Beyond any 
doubt, the ability to drive away the thought of vainglory through humility, or the power to repel 
the demon of impurity through temperance is a most profound proof of apatheia.”  Evagrius 
sometimes appears to rank apatheia as the primary virtue, at other times, he appears to give this 
place to more distinctively Christian virtues, for example he writes in one place that “the 
kingdom of Heaven is apatheia of the soul along with true knowledge of existing things.”198  
While in another he states that “the goal of the ascetic life is charity; the goal of contemplative 
knowledge is theology.  The beginnings of each are faith and contemplation of nature 
respectively...”199 
But while Evagrius is not entirely clear on the relative merits of apatheia vis a vis charity, 
other ascetics are.  To demonstrate this we turn to John Climacus, and his work The Ladder of 
Divine Ascent.  Climacus (d. 649) was a monk of the Arabian desert near Mount Sinai.  He was 
familiar with Evagrius’s writings and incorporated the logoismoi into his spiritual manual The 
Ladder of Divine Ascent, written to help train other monks of his monastery.200  The Ladder is 
among the greatest works of Christian Spirituality and a part of the massive Eastern mystical 
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corpus known as the Philokalia.201  The work evokes the image of a ladder reaching to heaven 
from earth.  Each of its thirty chapters represents a step, or rung of a ladder, with each rung 
constituting a virtue to master, vice to overcome, temptation to renounce, or grace to receive.   
Step 1 – Renunciation 
Step 2 – Detachment 
Step 3 – Exile 
Step 4 – Obedience 
Step 5 – Penitence 
Step 6 – Remembrance of Death 
Step 7 – Sorrow 
Step 8 – Anger 
Step 9 – Malice 
Step 10 – Slander 
Step 11 – Talkativeness 
Step 12 – Falsehood 
Step 13 – Despondency 
Step 14 – Gluttony 
Step 15 – Lust 
Step 16-17 – Avarice 
Step 18-20 – Insensitivity 
Step 21 – Fear 
Step 22 – Vainglory 
Step 23 – Pride 
Step 24 – Simplicity 
Step 25 – Humility 
Step 26 – Discernment 
Step 27 – Stillness 
Step 28 – Prayer 
Step 29 – Dispassion 
Step 30 – Love.202 
 
 
As one progresses from chapter to chapter, he or she grows in virtue, ascends the ladder, 
separates themselves from the Earth, and comes closer to God.  Evidence of Stoic and Evagrian 
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influence is clear. There are chapters dedicated to apatheia (here translated “dispassion”)203 as 
well as to each of the Eight Logoismoi.204  In this instance, while apatheia or dispassion and 
Charity or love are ranked very closely, the Christian virtues Faith, Hope, And Love, “the 
ultimate trinity of virtues,” hold primacy.205 
 This leads us to a final distinctive characteristic of Christian cognitive therapy: the 
necessity of divine grace.  As we have noted, Christian cognitive therapy deals in categories of 
Nature and Reason, as with the Stoics and CBT.  But unlike Stoicism and CBT, Evagrius and 
Climacus are careful to avoid making Reason into an idol.206  They do this in a number of ways.  
Firstly, because for Christians the mental life is impacted by supernatural agents, one can make 
objective cognitive progress in absolute terms and yet fail to show humanly observable evidence 
of such progress.  Likewise, one may show the appearance of moral or cognitive progress which 
may be nothing more than demonic trickery.  Climacus warns that demons can collude with one 
another to create this effect. 
The demon of vainglory and the demon of praise came to sit on either side of me.  One 
poked me with the finger of vainglory and encouraged me to talk publicly about some 
vision or labor of mine in the desert.  I shook him off with the words: ‘Let those who 
wish me harm be driven back and let them blush’ (Ps. 39:15).  Then the demon on my left 
at once said in my ear: ‘Well done! Well done!  You have become great by conquering 
my shameless mother.’ Turning to him I answered appropriately, making use of the rest 
of the verse: ‘Defeat and shame on all who say, “Well done! Well done!” …  Dread 
vainglory urges us to pretend that we have some virtue which does not belong to us.  It 
encourages us with the text: “Let your light shine before men that they will see your good 
deeds: (Matt 5:16).  The Lord often humbles the vainglorious by causing some dishonor 
to befall them.  And indeed the first step in overcoming vainglory is to remain silent and 
to accept dishonor gladly.  The middle stage is to check every act of vainglory while it is 
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still in thought.  The end – insofar as one may talk of an end to an abyss – is to be able to 
accept humiliation before others without actually feeling it.207 
 
Evagrius warns that the same effect can be caused by competition among the demons: “I have 
observed the demon of vainglory being chased by nearly all the other demons, and when his 
pursuers fell, shamelessly he drew near and unfolded a long list of his virtues.”208  For this 
reason he advises, “Both the virtues and the vices make the mind blind.  The one so that it may 
not see the vices; the other, in turn, so that it might not see the virtues.”209 
 The main point in all this is that, for a Christian, our emotions are not merely natural 
processes controlled by inanimate antecedents such as neurotransmitters and hormones, or 
stimuli and responses to them.  The passions, in so far as they are influenced by demonic or 
angelic forces, have a mind of their own and will creatively seek new ways gain influence over 
our lives.  As Evagrius says, “When the demons achieve nothing in their struggles against a 
monk they withdraw a bit and observe to see which of the virtues he neglects in the meantime.  
Then all of a sudden they attack him from this point and ravage the poor fellow.”210  While some 
demons can be bested, others are simply too strong or crafty for us to overcome them on our 
own.  Evagrius advises that only Christ can provide what is needed to overcome such demons. 
If there is any monk who wishes to take the measure of some of the more fierce demons 
so as to gain experience in his monastic art, then let him keep careful watch over his 
thoughts.  Let him observe their intensity, their periods of decline and follow them as 
they rise and fall.  Let him note well the complexity of his thoughts, their periodicity, the 
demons which cause them, with the order of their succession and the nature of their 
associations.  Then let him ask from Christ the explanations of these data he has 
observed.211 
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Unlike the Stoic “Wise Man” who is beyond emotional perturbation, the Christian, as he 
or she becomes more holy, is attacked all the more aggressively by demonic thoughts, “For the 
demons become thoroughly infuriated with those who practice active virtue in a manner that is 
increasingly contemplative.  They are even of a mind to ‘pierce the upright of heart though, 
under cover of darkness’ (Ps 10:3).”212  Climacus agrees that as one progresses, the battle gets 
not easier, but harder, 
Violence (Matt.11:12) and unending pain are the lot of those who aim to ascend to 
heaven with the body and this is especially at the early stages of the enterprise, when our 
pleasure-loving disposition and our unfeeling hearts must travel through overwhelming 
grief toward the love of God and holiness.  It is hard. Truly hard.  There has to be an 
abundance of invisible bitterness, especially for the careless, until our mind, that cur 
sniffing around the meat market and reveling in the uproar, is brought through simplicity, 
deep freedom from anger and diligence to a love of holiness and guidance.  Yet full of 
passions and weaknesses as we are, let us take heart and let us in total confidence carry to 
Christ in our right hand and confess to Him our helplessness and our frailty.  We will 
carry away more help than we deserve, if only we constantly push ourselves down into 
the depths of humility.213 
 
Humans need constant supernatural grace to understand the full extent of our thoughts 
and emotions and to contend with the demonic creatures that manipulate them.  This fact entail a 
need for the virtue of humility in ways not discussed by either the Stoics or CBT.  For as one 
ascends the Ladder he or she contends with craftier and mightier foes who are more able to turn 
their successes into defeat.  The way to apatheia and to God requires an enormous bounty of 
divine aid which we could never deserve or earn from our own merits alone; we are pulled up 
from above far more than we pull ourselves up from below.  Without humility, the demons use 
this principle to their advantage.  As Climacus writes, 
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Some passions enter the body by way of the soul, and some work in the opposite way, the 
latter affecting people living in the word, the former assailing those living the monastic 
life and, hence, lacking stimulus from the outside…  After we have fought long and hard 
against this demon [fornication], this ally of the flesh, after we have driven it out of our 
heart, torturing it with the stone of fasting and the sword of humility, this scourge goes 
into hiding in our bodies, like some kind of worm, and it tries to pollute us, stimulating us 
to irrational and untimely movements.  This particularly happens to that who have fallen 
to the demon of vainglory, for since dirty thoughts no longer preoccupy their hearts they 
fall victim to pride…Poor wretches!  They forgot the saying: ‘What have you got that 
you did not receive as a gift either from God or as a result of the help of prayers of 
others?’ (1 Cor 4:7).214 
 
St. Anthony, quoting St. Paul, anticipated this concept, “For when one repeated too often those 
triumphs which were wrought for him Saint Anthony answered and said, “It was not I who 
worked, but His grace which was with me’ (1 Corinthians XV, 10).”215 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the history of Stoic influence on Christianity from the Old 
Testament through the Patristic era.  The Stoic idea of controlling the passions by subjecting 
them to reason was appreciated in the early Christian community, especially by the Christian 
Ascetics, such as Evagrius, and John Climacus, who developed their own techniques and 
programs for helping people to control their emotions and behaviors in the pursuit of holiness.  
Christians tended to ground theirs in a virtue-based form of moral reasoning which provided 
norms and purpose for their therapeutic techniques.  The virtue ethics used by the Christians 
bears similarities to Stoicism, as seen, for example in the invocation of classic virtues like 
temperance and apatheia.  However, they clearly subordinated the Greek virtues to more 
distinctly Christian ones, most notably faith, hope, and love.  In addition, Christians synthesized 
cognitive therapy with demonology which elevated the importance of humility in ways not seen 
                                                          




in Stoicism.  Finally, though Christian ascetics (as represented by Anthony, Evagrius, and 
Climacus) believed, as the Stoics did, in the importance of reason for overcoming the passions, 
they are far less certain than the Stoics of the extent to this can be achieved through human 
reason alone.  For them, whatever progress one makes in conquering the passions and depends 

















Chapter 4: Summary and Future Directions 
In this chapter I tie together the themes of the previous chapters by pointing out what 
modern CBT and Christian asceticism, both heavily influenced if not inspired by Stoicism, have 
to lean from one another.  Specifically I will argue that modern CBT can gain moral insights 
from examining how the Christian tradition adopted and adapted the practices of cognitive 
therapy while retaining their foundation in a morally normative vision of human nature, and that 
Christian asceticism and spiritual disciplines can learn from CBT’s empirical and scientific rigor. 
Morally Grounding CBT 
Unlike its Stoic sources, CBT lacks a theory human flourishing and offers no answers to 
questions about what constitutes healthy or ideal mental functioning.  It is focused only on 
relieving negative symptoms as opposed to fostering positive virtues.  As one therapist-scholar 
points out, “Ironically, what perhaps is missing from the REBT and CBT appropriations of this 
Stoic precept [of cognitive therapy] is some recognition of the corresponding positive value 
which it implies should be attached to the development and exercise of one’s psychological 
strengths, the role of love in Stoicism, the love of wisdom [philo-sophia].”216  Rather than a way 
of life, like Stoicism or Christianity, CBT is more a kind of rhetorical technology for behavioral 
and emotional control.217  This problem is by no means limited only to CBT, but is endemic to 
most other modern forms of psychotherapy.  Without a robust idea of people ought to think and 
behave, CBT (any psychotherapy in general) cannot rightly claim to be mentally or behaviorally 
medicinal, remedial, or therapeutic.  It can only claim to be pleasant. 
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The pioneers of CBT, such as Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck, were likely limited in their 
thinking by modern prejudices against teleological views of Human Nature, prejudices which 
have come to dominate modern social thought on morality in general.218  Modern 
psychotherapists, not unlike their Stoic predecessors, have tended to present themselves as gurus 
of human flourishing, often positioning themselves in quasi-religious roles, without having any 
defensible theory of what human flourishing entails.  As Thomas Szasz points out, 
All this betokens still another aspect of the implacable resolve of psychotherapy to rob 
religion of as much as it can, and to destroy what it cannot: contrition, confession, prayer, 
faith, inner resolution, and countless other elements are expropriated and renamed as 
psychotherapy; whereas certain observances, rituals, taboos, and other elements of 
religion are demeaned and destroyed as the symptoms of neurotic or psychotic 
illnesses.219 
 
This tendency is widespread in modern times, dominated as they are by human fact/value 
distinctions220 and presumptions that teleology and the idea of a Cosmic Providence has been 
discredited by an evolutionary model of biology that emphasizes chaos and randomness;221 or by 
the denial that there are basic principles of human flourishing which are consistent and universal 
across all cultures that bind humans together as a species, and that Human Nature a merely social 
construct.222  Where therapeutic techniques and healing wisdom were once expressions of 
something transcendent, harmoniously integrating human behavior within the order of Nature, 
today they are mere expressions of technological power to make people feel good instead of be 
good, merely another tool for power, control, and manipulation of one human being over 
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another, however much that manipulation may be desired.223  The criticisms which Noam 
Chomsky leveled against B.F. Skinner and the behaviorists apply in full force to the cognitivist 
therapies that followed. But there is hope. 
 The Stoics have shown us that it is possible to ground cognitive therapy in a 
cosmopolitan moral vision of humanity and the world.  And Christian ascetics have shown us 
that cognitive therapy may be imported with great success into new traditions and contexts with 
such a guiding moral vision fully intact.  The Stoics’ cognitive therapy was guided in practice by 
their Virtue Ethics, principally by the virtue of apatheia, and by their theory of Natural Law.  
The role of Natural Law in ancient Christian cognitive therapy remains unclear,224 but role of 
idealized virtues remains intact, if not amplified in the ascetic practices.  Such a feat could be 
replicated for CBT. 
In fact, as the cognitive sciences have progressed, the idea of a morally-grounded CBT 
has become more plausible.  The Cognitive Revolution which paved the way for CBT has since 
generated research that has increased our understanding of human morality.  The idea of an 
innate human nature was frowned upon during the 20th century, but the cognitive sciences have 
resurrected it.225  Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists have begun to show how some 
moral principles have a universal, evolutionary basis.226  And developments in primatology are 
disconfirming the modern prejudices against ideas of a universal Human Nature.  As 
primatologist Franz De Waal has argued, primate social interactions both in the wild and in 
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captivity are clearly governed by moral norms such as fairness, empathy, and altruism,227 adding 
support to the thesis that just as our primate relatives do not socially construct morality, neither 
do we.  If these studies continue to be vindicated by further research, CBT may be in an ever-
better position to integrate some form of Natural Law theory simply on the basis of empirical 
observations. 
Finally, there is the growing movement known as “Positive Psychology,” led by former 
president of the American Psychological Association.  Seligman has argued for a greater 
integration the concept of virtue as a guiding principal in psychotherapy.  He has proposed that 
exercise of the virtues build character, which is a key factor not only in navigating and 
overcoming psychological distress, but in positively flourishing.  This movement has provided 
much empirical research into various virtues, and shown how their practice can lead to positive 
outcomes in psychotherapy.228  This movement is still young, and it’s conceptualization of virtue 
is far less robust than the conceptualizations offered by the Stoics or the monastics,229 yet it 
shows that cognitive psychology continues to provide promise for a possible armistice between 
Christianity and psychotherapy in the near future. 
Empirically Grounding Christian Counseling 
As a whole, Christian pastoral counseling and spiritual direction lacks standards.  Its 
theories and practices are either largely idiosyncratic230 or fragmented along sectarian lines.231  
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Yet committed Christians are often leery of turning to secular psychology as an alternative.  
Many turn to their pastors who they expect to be able to help, but who often have little training in 
modern empirically-validated techniques and practices such as CBT and often have to improvise 
their methods.232  But such a predicament is unnecessary.  Christian history has produced 
multiple cognitive therapies whose foundational theories and techniques are grounded by the 
same empirical science that grounds mainstream CBT.  Thanks to their common ancestor in 
Stoicism, there need not be any vast chasm separating the basic theories, methodologies, and 
terminology of Christian counselors from more mainstream CBT therapists.  There may always 
be fundamental conflicts of worldview between Christian and mainstream counselors, but to a 
large degree Stoicism provides an intersection at which Christian counseling and mainstream 
CBT can meet and speak a common language, should they choose to do so.  Furthermore, its 
pedigree within Christianity – from the Old Testament, through the teachings of Christ, and the 
letters of St. Paul – suggest that the utilization of Stoicism as a lingua franca could help foster 
increased unity among Christians who practice pastoral counseling and spiritual direction, for it 
may provide a cosmopolitan space in which to build consensus among Christian counselors of 
different denominational traditions, foster ecumenical dialogue, and possibly even help resolve 
theological disputes. 
Conclusion 
This study has argued that Stoic philosophy inspired the development of modern CBT 
and Christian asceticism.  In Stoicism, cognitive therapy functions against the backdrop of 
teleological views of Human Nature in the form of Natural Law and virtue-based morality, the 
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latter of which was also adopted and adapted by the Christian ascetics.  However, the forms 
which cognitive therapy took on under the auspices of modern psychotherapy (i.e. CBT) lack any 
significant moral component, which represents a moral hazard for CBT.  The first chapter 
presented the history and theory behind CBT and showed how it lacks moral grounding.  The 
second chapter summarized Stoic teachings on Nature and the passions and how these ideas 
provided moral grounding for their use of Stoic cognitive-therapeutic techniques.  The third 
chapter showed how Stoic philosophy influenced early Christianity, and how Christian ascetics 
adapted Stoic techniques of cognitive therapy into unique systems which took account of their 
theological and soteriological worldview.  In this final chapter we argued that the integration of 
natural law and virtue ethics in the Stoic and ancient Christian versions of cognitive therapy may 
serve as a model for possible future developments in CBT, and that many CBT practices can be 












Appendix 1: Natural Law and Virtue Ethics 
There does not appear to be any explicit theory of Natural Law involved in the therapies 
of Evagrius or Climacus.  However, it would not be baseless to say that Natural Law played an 
implicit role.  There are some possible hints of Natural Law reasoning scattered through the 
writings of Evagrius and Climacus.  For example Climacus writes, “He is a lover of God that is 
in communion with all that is sinless and natural…”233 and Evagrius writes “…But these 
[demons], for their part, draw our anger to worldly desires and constrain us – contrary to our 
nature – to fight against our fellow men to the end that, blinded in mind and falling away from 
knowledge, our spirit should become a traitor to virtue. 234 
There are historical factors favoring an inference that Natural Law played an implicit 
role.  Firstly, as we have seen, there is evidence of Natural Law reasoning in the writings of St. 
Paul, of which Evagrius and Climacus undoubtedly aware.  Secondly, historically the city of 
Alexandria in Egypt, the cultural epicenter most geographically proximal to most of the desert 
fathers and one of the foremost centers of learning in the Roman Empire, had a heritage Jewish 
and Christian Natural Law thinkers by the time of the ascetics.  By the time of Evagrius, it 
already had a long history of producing thinkers ready and willing to synthesize Judeo-Christian 
ideas with Greek ones. 
The important center in Hellenistic times for the meeting of Philosophy and religion was 
Alexandria.  It was here that the search for moral and spiritual certainty produced a spirit 
of syncretism in which men became accustomed to entertain what was offered in all 
doctrines and ceased to be great extent to respect close distinctions in theory.  In 
syncretism one finds at last the truth in many systems, or, in another sense, the truth as it 
rests in one system is viewed as reasonably approximated in other systems…”235  
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Certainly, by the time of Philo of Alexandria (ca. 25 BC-50AD), there was a strong tradition of 
synthesizing the Jewish and Christian Theology of Divine Commandment with Hellenistic 
Natural Law Philosophy, and “Greek Natural Law ideas supported an ideal of virtue and justice 
which was in general agreement with the ancient Hebrew moral law.”236  These ideas were also 
important in the thought of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, the theological mentor to 
Evagrius and many other of the great Egyptian ascetics.  Although there is no explicit reference 
to Natural Law, it is likely that Natural Law reasoning played an implicit role in their moral 
reasoning, parallel to their idea of divine command. 
Whatever the role of Natural Law reasoning may or may not have played, the role of 
Virtue Ethics is clear; the cognitive techniques of both Evagrius and John Climacus are clearly 
guided by the shunning of vices (i.e. the eight logoismoi) and by idealized virtues (e.g. Chastity, 
Humility, Wisdom, Faith, Hope, Love), providing vital moral guidance to their cognitive 
techniques. 
 By the 13th century Thomas Aquinas’s Summa included treatises on both Natural Law, 
the passions, and the virtues weaving together nearly all of the strands of thought on cognitive 
therapy in an attempt to synthesize the learning of the Greeks with the faith of the Christians, 
though his theory did not propose any specific therapeutic techniques for change as did the 
Stoics, CBT, Evagrius or Climacus.  Aquinas lays out his cognitive theory in his Treatise on 
Human Acts in the Summa Theologiae.   For him, human actions are the result of an interplay 
between different parts of a person’s soul: the will, the intellect, and the passions: the passions 
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are the “appetite” of the will,237 and the will is moved by the intellect.238  And Aquinas connects 
his theory of human actions with his theory of Natural Law through the concept of telos, or the 
“last ends” of man: that human beings naturally strive towards goodness and happiness as the 
fulfillment of their nature.239 Unfortunately, Aquinas never developed his cognitive theory into 
operationalizable therapeutic techniques.  How Aquinas might have explained specific 
techniques used in cognitive therapy today (e.g. Dialectical Behavior Therapy, or Schema 
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Appendix 2: Angels and Demons 
In the 21st century, talk of demons in any work of scholarship is likely to be met with 
scorn, so it seems necessary to give some defense.  Angelology and Demonology are deeply 
rooted in the historical and theological foundations of Christianity.  Besides familiar angel 
stories, such as the angel Gabriel appearing to Mary, the angels at the destruction of Sodom and 
Gomorrah, or the angels at Christ’s empty tomb, there are many appearances in the Bible of 
demons.  The conquest of demons is a central component of Christ’s life and ministry.  He is 
driven out into the desert where he is tempted by Satan,240 and many of His healings are 
attributed to His authority over demons, so much so that He is even accused of being in league 
with demons himself.241  He gives His disciples power over demons; though some demons prove 
to be too powerful for them.242  St. Paul reaffirms the reality of demons when he explains the 
dangers of idolatry, “No, I imply that what pagans sacrifice they offer to demons and not to God” 
(1 Cor 10:20).   
Very little about this was original to Christianity.  In fact, Christian Angelology and 
Demonology is just another of the artifacts attesting to its Hellenistic roots.  The demons (or 
daimona as are known in Greek) played an important role in Greek culture, philosophy, and 
theology.  Daimona were intermediaries between the world of humans and the world of the 
Divine.  Today the word “demon” has connotations of evil, but this was not necessarily the view 
of the ancient Greeks, this was a development which came over time. 
Since lesser gods and intermediary powers were identified with demons, there was a 
demonizing of religion…  The word demons did not have the negative connotations it 
does today, but as unlucky happenings were attributed to intermediary beings or forces it 
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began to acquire even in pagan thought something of a pejorative sense.  The demons 
filled the gap between the gods and human beings and between the superlunary world and 
the earth.  Demons had their starting point in abstract powers, ghosts, and the 
unexplained in human nature.  They came to be identified with beings under the one God.  
Peoples of the Roman empire, if not “demon possessed” or rather demon influenced (as 
the Christian apologists suggest), were certainly demon conscious.243 
 
 The idea of good and evil daimona vying with each other for influence over a person’s 
moral choices was a popular trope even for the Greeks.  Everett Fergusson presents a collection 
of notable examples: 
Socrates referred to a demon that warned him against certain actions (Plato, Apology 
31D, 40A), thus giving to the demon a function almost like the conscience…  Plato’s 
varied use of the term influenced its future development.  One work says that the demons 
are the sons of gods by nymphs or other mothers, serving as interpreters between gods 
and people ([?] Epinomis 984E); in this sense demon is a generic term for divine 
intermediaries.  Plato’s writings also regard the demon as a destiny spirit somewhat like a 
guardian angel as a companion of persons (Phaedo 107D; Republic 617D; Statesman 
271D, 272E) or of cities as well as of individuals (Laws 713C, 738D).  He also refers 
“demon” to the highest and divine element in a person.  From the idea of a demon 
accompanying each person came the use of the word as virtually equal to “fate” (but as 
referring to the personal destiny of a individual without the capriciousness of Tyche).  
Xenocrates, Plato’s student, systematized demonology.  He and later philosophers listed 
three classes of demons: permanently disincarnate beings, souls of the deceased, and the 
soul “in” or intelligence accompanying us.  He ascribed human passions to them and 
made the distinction that some demons were good and some bad.  From this came the 
idea that each person has two demons, one good and one bad.  By the fourth century B.C. 
the word was deteriorating into use only for unlucky happenings.  Since once avoided 
putting the blame for evil happenings on the gods, they were attributed to the demons.  
Thus the way was prepared for regarding demons as evil beings…244 
 
The purpose of these stories is not to revel in superstition, but neither should they be 
considered as mere metaphors for human suffering.245  In the minds of the Christian ascetics, 
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Angelology and Demonology function in tandem with cognitive therapy: the demons propose 
irrational or tempting thoughts, while the angels assist in overcoming them. 
The stories are clear that these demons were not hallucinations.  On some occasions, the 
demons manifested their supernatural powers on him physically, at one point beating him so 
badly that a friend had to intervene to rescue Anthony. 
Then they began to smite him with blows, and they smote him so severely that at length 
he fell on the ground, and nothing but his breath was left in him; and Saint Anthony used 
to relate that the blows with which the devils smote him were more severe than those of 
the children of men.  But God brought help unto him, and would not deliver him over to 
death, for He put it into the mind of him that used to visit him to come quickly, and to 
open the door of the tomb according to his wont, and he saw the blessed Anthony, who 
was like unto a dead man by reason of the blows; and straight-way he lifted him up and 
brought him to the church in the village.246 
 
To make it even more clear that these are not hallucinations, Athanasius records stories of people 
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